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This study is an attempt to evaluate th.e role played by topoe;ra:p� 
in the results of the ca.nrpaign 1n West and Middle Tennessee during the 
f:i.rst year of t,he Wa;r Between the States. ln mid-nineteenth century 
America, roads were poor and comrmmication was extremely slow. The use 
of.' tbe tele{;ra:::Jh was not yet widespread; mountains and rivers still 
presented formidable barr·Lrs to travel, "JJ1d the chief i1lSans of move-
nent for troops YJas by railroad, ste amboat, horseback, ar:d on foot. 
As the main scarce for primary materials for this thesis I ha:ve 
relied on the War of the Rebellion, A Com;1ilation of the Official ......,._ -- ........... ... - - ___ ....... 
Records of tbe Un:l.on and Confederate Armies. 'l'he Atlas 1:Yhich accom:Hmies 
......;..;....;.;.....;;;.;;.;.. ..;..;;._....;.. - - ....;..;,...;...;.......;---- _..._... ..... 
these records has aleo been invaluable for :1aterial relating to troop 
movenents and positions as well as for ase as a source for portions of 
the maps included in this project. 
It is hoped tl:.at the ma)s will aid the reader in understanding 
the to�;ography of too localities ·with which the study is concerned. 
The maps are not drawn to scale but are 'J.sed to show troop moveroonts in 
respect to prominon:t relief feat�J.res and politicaJ. boundaries. 
1 am deeply indebted to Doctor StanlEr.f J. folmsbee of the Univer-
s1.ty oi' Tennessee History Department, who sucL:ested the subject of this 
thesis and provided ins,)ira:t.ion and guidance during its preparation. I 
would also liloo to ex;,;Jress r:tr appreciation to Doctor Eruph w. Haskins 
and Doctor H. c. Amick, whose painstakine exa:G".ination and helpful 
cor1.rnents have contributed gre:.Lt]JI· to tho study. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The attack on Fort Sumter in connection wi t.h the seces::.ion o£ the 
various states which comprised the Confederacy 1 began the gigantic 
struggle which was to last four years and claim the lives o.f thousands 
of Ar.dericans. The great experinent in democracy was threatened by the 
dissension of a part of the Union's mmber states. Vll:wn armed conflict 
appeared imminent , the Confederacy claimed it would fit7)1t only i.f federal. 
troops threatened her territory. Im,i:ediately, it became evident that 
the North would not see the Union dissolved without a strmwla J the hope 
of sone people for peaceful secession was only wishful thinking. The 
call8 to arms were issued by and for Federals and Confederates alike. 
Those calla were arumered by "Johnz:w Reba" and "Billy Ya.nks" in great 
numbers. 1'he Confederate States of America organized their military 
forces as best they could, with ll1&q,V valiant men resigning positions in 
the United States Arl'l\Y to fight in the interest of their homes and 
states. The Union Arnw 1 while already organized and p odsessing a. wealth 
of o:f the tradition of victory, was certainly in no condition to oppose 
as formidable a foe as its southern counterpart later came to be. Thus, 
great preparations were made by both sides in the months irrrmediately 
following the organization of the provisional government of the Confederate 
States of Arne rica in February, 1861. 
'l'he Confederacy was faced with the defense of a frontier which 
stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the western extrenes of Arkansas. 
This provided for a defense lim upwards of 1200 miles long. In order to 
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subdue the rebellion, the Union forces were in turn faced with tb.e neces .... 
sity of brea.ldng the Confederate defense line and invading the South. For 
both sides, there was also the di.ffic-1.1lty involved of crossing the border 
states of Ma_r..rla.nd, Delaware, Kentucl<;t, and Missouri. These s ta.tes were 
in marzy- Ylqs friendly to the Confederate cause but refused to secede !rom 
the Union,. even though tradition and economy linked them to the se ceded 
states. They 18\Y' like a wide belt of "no man •s land" between the two 
gladiat<rs. To add to this involved situation, the Confederacy was divided 
into three separate parts by two outstanding topographic features. The 
more .formidable of these was the Blue Ridge Mountains which in that dq 
defied effective communications and divided the South distinctly into 
east and west. Later it might be sa.id1 'With some truth, that there were 
in many respects two separate ware in progress in the South at the sa.'Jle 
time. f'urthermore, the west was again divided rut by a somewhat less 
formidable barrier, the Mississippi River. The northern border of the 
C onfederacy was not clearly established for several months after the pro­
visional. government was organized. This was soon reil'ledied in the east 
l:zy" the secession of Virginia, vlhich in turn provided the Potomac Rh-er 
as a natural and clearly defined boundary, but until Mq, 1861, when 
Arkansas seceded and Tenressee formed a. military league vd th t."le Confed­
eracy, the northern boundaries of Louisiana., Mississippi, Alabama, and 
Georgia formed the extent of the Confederacy. 
The fact that Kentucky and Missouri did not join the Confederacy 
caused the loss of such a natural boundar.r as the Ohio and Upper 
tississipp1 Rivers. As the war prof,ressed it became more and more 
apparent that the Confederacy 's weakest point was its left flank, and 
the eventual downfall of the Confederacy was tl:"Jfl turninG of that flank. 
Credit for selecting for attack that vu.lrerable portion of the 
Confederate line is usually given to General Winfield. Scott. At the 
beginning of the war he was the most experienced officer in the Union 
ranl<3. .ltlthough he was advanced in age and was later replaced, :h.e con-
ceived the idea of a Federal occupation of the entire Mississippi 
Valley by force thereby splitting the Confederacy in hal!.l After 
accomplishing this, he pla.:n:ood to halt and wait for Union sentiment in 
the South to force that government to sue for pea.c..-e. This was known 
as the Anaconcla. plan. V•hile it was never followed as pla.n."led_, it pro­
vided the basis for the over.Ul Federal strategy in the west.2 
The topography of the states of Kentucky and Tennessee are similar 
in ma<"''lY ways • Both present a wide variety of surface features and are 
long and comparatively' narrow from cast to west. The Appalachian Houn-
tains form the eastern extent and highest elevations of both. To the 
west of these mountains the lower ridges and foothills are in evidence. 
These serve to isolate East Tennessee somel'lha.t, and at the time of the 
Civil War presented a formidable barrier to communication. Tnese lower 
ranges, the Cu.mberland Mountain Hange or Plateau as it is o.t"ten called1 
are traversed by high and narrow passes in the vicinity of the East 
�  2£. the Rebellion: !.. Compilation 2f. the ?f£icial Recorda 
of the Union annoitl'e<Ierate Arnues, 76 vo!S. (vra9iungtonl rkiver:nment 
Printing ol'l'ice1 188U:i9C51), §iries 11 Vol. 511 369-370.; Cited here­
after as Official Records. 
2T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Knopf1 
1952), 16-18. 
--
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Tennessee and Y�ntuc!\Y state line., West of this there is a. somewhat 
lower plateau. remnant, the Highland Rim, which completely encircles t.he 
rich .Naslwille Ba.sin in Tennessee. This basin is a fertile agricultur­
al region and forms the hinter-land for NashYille 1 Tennessee • It is 
traversed from east to west b'J the Olmberland River. To the north in 
Ken "tacky the surface is roll int, and undulating in the now fatn<:r-.15 blue 
gras::: area, 3.::3 it slopes northward. toward the Ohio Liver. The Tennessee 
Htvor follO'Ws it.D narrow v<llloy nCJ:rtln;<3J:'d1 crossing both T:.,.rlT;ossec a..'J.d 
Kentucky on its western course to the Ohio. On either side of its 
n.a . rrovt flood plain, -'�he terrain brea:ks away r&ther abru.ptly 1 on the 
east toward the Western Highl,:,u1d Idm ru:�d on the lli'est towm·d ·the nearby 
Divide of West Te:·messee which :;ep3.l"ates the drainage to the Tennessee 
from that t,r.J the Mississi�}pi. 1'1J.e ru:ea alon£; these 'banks is :,ome\vhat. 
rugged and covered with. scru.b growth. West of the Divlde is the Slope 
of tiest Tennessee 1 part of the Gulf' Coastal Plain. 111is covers almost 
all of 1'\.�st 'l'ennessee and Vfestern Kentucey. It is either gently rolling 
or hilly in :r.ost places • This area is the Nost level land in Tennessee 
and has alw�s been the center of cott,on culture in the s"tiate. Here 
between the Tennessee and .:..lississippi Hivers secession sentimrmt woo 
very strong in 'l'ermessee. 
Ex<1.'11.ination of a map of the Dout.�-centra.l section of' the United 
Sta:tes will dJ.OTT the ir:.:.:;or�,rmce o:f tho rliror systems wh:.ch provide €HMJY' 
transportation from the north, particularly into the states of N3ntucey, 
'i'em".lessee, U'l!ssissippi, and Alabama. These rivers had been used as a. 
means of conveyance since the earliest pioneer dS([s in t..'he West. The 
- - ----
era of the steamboat was at its helght in the decades preceding the 
Civil War� and in 1861, the rivers constituted ��e major arteries of 
tra."'l.sportation in their respecM.ve states. The 1'ormes:.:;ee and Cumberland 
were virtual highWk\VS from the Ohio into the very heart of Tennessee, 
fro:n. north. to south whiclt co�l()teJ�r bis�cted the Confederacy. Thus 1 
the com11andinr, military- positions in the west were on or near these 
rivers. Both opposine arr.rles Vlere quick to avail themselves of t..l-:tese 
strater,ic sites. The professed mutrality of Kentucky held up the occu-
pation of some of these points for a ti.-rne; however, as soon as it becMJS 
evident that Kentucky was gcinr; to remain in the Union, the scramble was on 
for choice military :positions. F'arly in September, 18611 Federal troops 
occupied Louisville and M:aysville, Kentucky. !'hey were already estab-
lished at Ca..iro, Illinois, and soon afterward, Brigadier General UJ,.ys�es 
s. Grar t, who sought to occu:ny Cohunbus, Kentuclcy-1 on the Mississippi 
River.- was th:warted in this plan by the occupation of that place by a 
Coni'ederate force under Major C'-.eT�.eral Ie .,nidas Pollr. Instead, on Sep• 
te"aber 4, Grant OCC1!pied Paducah at the mouth cf the Tel"..nessee River, 
Thus 1 vd th the Federals in poscesr:ions of the mouths oi' t:r.e Camber land 
an.d Tennessee Rivers and with an attack ir:mrl.nent, it became necessary 
for the Confederates to form a line in preparation for def'ense.3 
On Septe:nber 10, Albert Sidney Johnston was assigned the command 
.3sta.nley 1'-.• Horn, .!!!!t � 2£ Tennessee (New Yorka Bobbs Merrill, 
1941) J l�4-h5. 
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of Depa:r-t:lEmt lhm.ber 'l'wo, w�_,:l.ch comprised the states of TeP.mssee and 
Ark&'1.Saa and, in ad.d.itim11 north Mississip :.•i and the ::1ilitary operations 
in Kentuclcy-, Missouri, !Causae, and the Indian countcy immdiately west 
of Missouri and Arkansas. Johnston was accorded tho rank of General.; 
highest in the Confederate Arn.w, � it beca�IB his task to prepare the 
Confederate line of defense in the West. 4 This line fell into a rather 
natural order. On his wey -west from Richmond, Johnston stop::;ed in Knox-
ville and ordered General Felix K. Zollicoffer, Confederate commander 
in East Tennessee with a force of some .3000 to 4000 r:10n1 to occupy Cum-
berland Gap. Upon h:i.s arrival in Na.shvine, Johnston coJm:lissiomd as 
Drigadier General, s. B. Bucl:ncr, who had resigned his post a.s COT:1":l.a...id.er 
of the Kentucky State guard in order to serve the Con.federaC'J 1 sending 
him to occupy Bowline Green, Kontacky.5 Work had a.J..reacy oocun on 
J?orts Herx.r.r and Donelson on t):le 'l'enn:::scee and Cumberlarrl Rivers 1 and as 
previou.s:zy :mntioned, the Conf'odsrates had occupied Columbus on the 
!Iississippi River. 
The belated movement into Kentucky cost the Confederates the 
possession of aey natural barrier along which t:f::ey micht have arrajyed 
their defense. The Ohio River would have provided such a barrier, 'tr...tt 
the Federal occupation of Paducah and LO'u.isville on the soJ.th bank of 
the river :nade its use impossible. 'lbus, JohP..ston was faced wl th d.e­
fellding a frontic; r of more than 400 miles with a poorly equipped arnw, 
4wi1Lam. Preston Johnston! Th.e Lifo of General Albert Sidnel Johnston (New York: Ap�)loton, lo7'81'; 29�. -
which never numbered many more tJ:o..an 401000 men a.s opposed to F'edera.l. 
forces numbering approximately 10,000. His line stretched from Cumber­
land Ford near the Virginia line in eastern Kentucl:y- to Columb-..ts1 
Kentucey, on the east bank of the Mississippi with Bowling Green the 
center and salient of the line. 
Johnston 1s forces were actually separated into three distinct 
armies. Polk held the left flank at Columbus 'lvith aboat 101000 man. 
7 
Yiith Johnston's aid, Colambus was soon placed in a good state of def'ense. 
earthworks v1ere erected, and Columbus W;:.tS arr:l.ed with long range gans in 
order to command the Mississippi River. A2 early as Noveml10r1 1861, it 
was virt..Ially an impregnable position and its loss was due only to 
evacu.ation Catlsed by the later flanking movements of the l''edara.l arnzy-
on the Cumberland and Tenressee Rivers. Its position was further 
strengthened �J the construction of river defenses at Island Number Ten, 
New 1,1adrid1 and F'ort Pillow, all on tf!e Mississippi River below Colum­
bus.. The center was commanded by Major General William J. Hardee whose 
headquarters was at Bowlit1g Green, in the heart of the Kentucey Blue 
Grass country of rolling hills and beautiful streat:lS. By Janua:ry, 18621 
his total force numbered around 25,000. Part of these were thrown out 
around }limfordvi1le in advance of Bowlj.ng Green. In the east Zolllcoffer 
had approximately 3000 to 4000 r:1en gaard:i..nr; Cumberland Gap and the im­
portant road junctions in the rugg;ed, mountainous terrain of southeast 
Kentucky. There were by this ti,'ll6 only skeleton garrisons in the incom­
plete works at Forts Henry and lhnelson under Brigadier General IJ.oyd 
Tilghman and two or three regiroonte at Hopkinsville, Kentucky, between 
Fort Donelson an.d Bcnvling Green. Johnston originally had his head· 
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quarters at Memphis, bJ. t reports of F'edera.l acti v-l t"'J in front of Bowling 
Green in ear�y October caused him to move to that place, 6 
Of all the Confederate defensive posi tio:ns ir. this line 1 Col1!mbt1s 
was perhaps the best pla.."1ned and exec:1.ted. It was a..'"'! eart.b:work defense 
re..enforced wl th sandbacs and was directed pri:narily at p:rovcmting the 
passage of l''ederal &'lmboats down the Misr:.d..ssir1pi River. The C'..ef'anse 
ccn:pletely surrounded the town of Coltunbus., which 11:as tJ1e northern terra-
inus of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. It consisted of fo·.1r reckru.bts 
wit.h most of the e:un emplacerrJt:mts being in a.:r.d on a high bl:J.f:f just 
north of the town. Ravin�a and ditches were c:mstructed ir.to an abatis 
of felled trees with a series of connected. rifle :;)its some f:.l.ve and one 
h� feet deep cor;J.:nand:i.ns t.t1e landward apprvaches to the defenses and 
the town. Gu.ns com.:"ltand:Lng the r:iver were sit11a.ted on the bluff • All 
the positions both landward and tO".va.rd the river were placed on favor­
able ground along corema:nding ridi::,"E!S or hills • 1 
This pos:Ltion was further strengthened by the construction of 
supporting defenses below Coltlmb�s at Island. lJu.mber Ten and l;jey, Madrid, 
llissouri. The island, situated in the bend of a. ·typical JJissis ip5)i 
ldver r:teculder., was fortified and a.rrJed with fifteen guns in tl:.lree redo:1bts. 
In ad1.:i.ition to this, the Cop.fedsrates had sunk a boat in t1:e channel in 
6� ... 61-62. 
1!!!:'£. 2£ � H.ebellion, !!_ Cor::pilation 2£. � Official Records 
of the Union and Confederate Armies, Atlas, 2 vols. (Washingtonr -- -
Government Printing Office, 1895), 11 Plate $. Cited hereafter as 
o. a. Atlas. -
order to o;:Jstruct navi;;,ation er:d construeted a floa:Lin;:; battery of n:i.ne 
ouJ.S j:1st ll0l.otv ths obstruction. T} e:r""' were <•.:too r.:.v6 redoubts, con-
9 
ta.ining t1"1SI!ty guns 1 placed eom.t'P..ndin.;_;J.y on the s o;ti:.h b:,�nk of i:.he r:l:ver • 
ooander al.'llost dl=.e nortJ.;, of it "l"!a.s t�1e tmrm of lkw 1!iadrid1 Hissouri. 
Here 1 t'b.c Confe,Jeratcs cm:lStructed 2.. fort cont<d.P.in� fourtl:1r:.m 2Lr and 
of the same size placed similarly on eiti:.ter s.t.de of the fort. These 
positions at Island liu.mber Ten and r-;ey; Maclrid servr_jd as support for the 
adva.'"!ced base at Col:.2mbLts1 and after the evacuation of the latter, the;r 
fell to the Union forces long after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson. 8 
Fort Henry on the Tem:sssee River antl Fort Donelson on the Cmn-
berlru.d �iiver ·t-Tere pre-d.esir,ned as the defense of Nashv::LJJ.o 1 one of the 
r.1ost strategic Confederate cities. As it late.r t:1rned out1 they 'tfte!'e 
't:.te key to the entire Confederate line. 'l'his ·will be dealt w:i.th •.nore 
tant ;,;oint in the Confederate line. It Yfas located at ·i:,he a�)�Jro.xinate 
geographical center of ·t.he line ru:d sli�;htl�,r !oriiard of the other strong-
holds. It was here t.;at the [;reatest cor;centrativn of Cor.federat,e 
troops in 1861 in the west was rnade. 'rhe tovm l tsel.f was a valuable 
position, being on the railroad from Nashville to Lou.isville 1 on the 
Green Iliver, a.r:d at a junction for roads in the area. In tmdition, it 
was situated among high hills wLich provided com:nanding postions for 
8 Ibid. 1 Plate 10. 
-
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troops.9 
On the right flank in eastern Kentuc!cy-1 Zollicofl:'er had advanced 
beyond C:.'um.berla.nd Gap and oc,_::lpied a pos:i.tion on it tLat would p1·otect 
both the Jamestown and Jaclr.sboro roads, Before doing this, tba ma"m-
tain l'Jass entrances into Tennesueo .,a,d been fortified. 'lhe right fJ.a.nk 
was never a statL·nar; defense dar:! .. �-;: these ea:rly months but 1maverod 
back and forth as the troops ?rore :.1ovod to craard t..he va:r::aus roads. 
Several ski.""T'lishes we:re fought. vli th tho I''ederal forcer� c.mder Gemral 
Geor;:e H. 'I'ho�:ta.S, and tbe C'J.L"'lination of activ-:L ty in tl :is area was the 
crushilli:: defeat of the Coni'edcrates at Logan's Cros;� lio<1ds on January 
19, 1862, in '\llhich Zollicoffer was ldlled. lu'ter thin, the Confederate 
defense line was at Cumberland Gap rum various other mountain passe�h10 
In addition to these main clements of the Cox1fcderate line, tb.ere 
1.verc detach.rnen-t,s at various points acrose Ei:mtuc}cy'. 'llo.ere were tv.·o o:r 
three :regiments a.t Hopkinsville and sane roving cava.lry detachments 
stationed at points along the line. .A:mong tr.ese cava.l.r'<J leaders were 
two roon who later played a great part in the war in the west. These 
were John H. !ii.crgan and Na:than Bedford For:rest.ll 
Thus 1 the Confedcr:::roo lire of defense was set. It was poorly 
man11ed by troops who were oftentimes ar;;13d only wit.� their shotg11ns 
or other doroostic weapons. It a:-:1ounted to littl.D more tha.."l a long 
9Johnston, � � Johnston, 316-317. 
l0norn1 .!!!! � 2.£ Tennessee,., 66-70. 
llibid.) 62. 
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liOJ'e f&Torable cireuetanoees but tbinga being as they llleft1 ita looa­
\ioa was governed b,y condi tiona which an well e.Jtplained b.r Oeneral 
lo!mst.on 1s $0ll 8ftd 'biographer, l'l1ll1aa Preston JehMto:cu 
lrl determining hil l.i.M ot operatiou 1 O.neral Johnaton 
had to cOMic»r the pogapb;y of the U..aV. of wv, tbe 
politioal com.plexticm ot t.b.e populat1oa1 and the strength ad 
diape.eitioa ot these toroea oppoeed to h1JI. Each o£ tbele 
oondi t.iou 'AI ef eueh a ehN"acter as to pUt hilll at a &ad­
Yantage." • .AI Ooluabwl and t.be Owaberlawt -...n� had be· 
..- tl'.MI eztn!ld tiea ot tbe Confederate UDe b.r torte � 
natural condi tiona, 10 Bclrl.ing Cb!'$en1 l1Jrlnriae 1 be._ tba 
a..U.nt ••• •AriT po1nt in aclYanae ot lelrl.:l.nc Clreea !f.:!!••at• J 
While BewlJ.ag Gnu itaelt, eitu.ate4 on t.bt tunp 1 rau­
road and river, wu a pod poaitioa for defellduuibe 11M 
wu not all that coulcl 'be wiebedJ it ran �<Mab 111 uatr1el14-
ll' or lukitwa:ra popu.l&tion, ant.\ it we.a piftooecl lv two_.., 
riwn (the fetmeiJaft ucl Gwaberl.&D4) 'Whoee 1J.fathe wre in 
the poet�easion of the •ntiO"J bl.tt eft17 ot.bar l.1Jae bacil equal 
or aP"e&ter 41aadYan�s. In ....,, ae el.lnhfte, w � .  
taD thinp .. - fiDtl thea, ., u - WOll 4 1ul:ft tlJia.U 
During the latter 110ntha of 1861 and. tbr011pow.t J&lll817 1 18611 
eaeb. U'!IV vutq ovenetim&ted. the other. Act1v11f' wu aJ.aoat en­
t1nll' or a preparatory nature on both aidaa with acoelel"ated re­
eruitiDC and cb'Uli.ng Miq CCIIIIDlOD tbrcugh•t tbe varica e..,. with 
the Federal prep&ratio.ne t• edvanoe al1d. the Ccmf'ederate for defeDM• 
CH.U".t'EEt II 
T1'.l6 portion ot the Con:tecffar&f&. JJ.m of de£&1188 llhieh be..- � 
kD7 to that ent.ire liM ftl eeleoted and situated ure by zea.l.ocla 
p&rti.e&nl t.ban b7 caleulat.i.ng erlgl.neers. .lt this tU. laahville ,.... 
the aupp]l' depot of the Cozafederaey in tbe west. It wu the lar&e8fr 
and llOit impor\ar!t ei\"Y in thl Confederate wat W1. th tbe ezoeptloa ot 
..., OJol.earMI. I\-. also a center tor riwr, r&ilroa41 aDd t.urnpU.. 
tratno an4 by the encl ot l86l. wu aupp:qins the Conte derate .ln!f' w1 tJt 
a YUt. ll'ltm1nt et nppliea euch u percwssion oapa, sabers, UB�sk£rte1 
saddles,. harness 1 lCDapaacka, uniforM 1 cannon, and rifled gruw • In 
eddi tion 1 t became the storage point for to'Od and other aupplles • Its 
location 011 the Owlberlencl Ri vvr 1 while helping the oi t¥ to .tlGUriah 
1n more peaoetul U.e, made it extreme]l' 'f\llnerable to attack tr• 
that quarter in time of...,..  lmmed.iate]l' alter Tennessee •cede<l an4 
'bet ore Johmlton •• li.ne of defense had awn beg1ut to take shape 1 
QowrllOJ" Isham o. Huria ot 'le!U16asee realized the danger of inv'uion 
of the state, u wU ae the oontributiOlla t.t> thU danger made by the 
�nee ot the 'feumeaee ud. Cl.Dlberlan4 Biftra aa i.nvi ting patb:lnv'a 
to the heart of the Sou1b. ln ..,.. he ordend that to:rtl be coDetnlct.d. 
on tbe riftra tor the dlltenee of the ata'ta, Uld oommilaioned. GeDJral 
Daniel s. Domlaon1 a West hint gt'aduate, to imeatigate the area anc1 
aeleot the beat poesible a11N tor such torte.l 
In thia selection of sites, it was neoetssa.ty to mmnin within the 
limits ot Termessee beeau.ae ot the profe•s•d nent'ralit,. of Kentu.ek;r, 
Which wu l'10t violated until Oontederate troops wre JIO"'ed into that 
stat& in m:i..S..S.ptember. Also1 it wu desinld that the forts be placed 
u far d.OWDGtftM from lashvillAt u possible 1n order tA provide u:d.­
lt!WI protection. tJpO'Jl examination of the «nta, General Doaelson reported. 
that a high blntf' em the west bank a mila below Doft:r in Stnan County 
was the best spot on the Cwaberl.aa4. He also reported that there •• 
no good pl.-oe for a deteui'ft position on the tenne&:Jee within the 
limit. of the at&te and. advised that a Bpot 'be oceu.pied several milea 
north of the Kentucq state line. & did, hOW'Ver, adopt the site o£ 
th4t later FQl"t Henry u the beat possible position in 'fenneasee on order 
of t:Jowrnor lia.l:Till. Dover wu sii'Aated tcrt.r miles from the mou.th ot 
the riftr and H'N�iw llilea f'rOil lubville 1 to which 1 t was con­
meted by a road. 1'he site aelsete<l on the 'l'enmssee wu OfllJr abou.t 
•lw miles al.m.ost due wat of the propoeed site on the Onmbarland.2 
The t.wo petitions were connected by twe roads.) 
It is intensting to notice t..ltat there were several good deten­
aift potitione along the rivera in lentu.eq. In the ViciniV � Orand 
Riwrs• about tort,' m.Uee bel• the adopted aitea, the Ownberland a.ncl 
Te1meaaee now to wi thill two or three miles of each other • before 
aepara:Ung toward their reepective mouths on the tllio. A defensive 
work erected here on favorable terrain, vtlth well plam:ed rifle pits and 
outworks, cmtld have com_;]anded both rivers and mainta:i.,'10d excenent 
co..'11,:tunications • Hovrever, the neu trali t:t of F.$ ntu Cl\)," could not oo vio-
lut.ed. "Tho coverning considerations were evidently pol:ttical, rather 
Tho c;:round on whicl-: thJ fort on the 'l'enmssce, rorred l'ort Henry 
in honor of Gustavus A. Henry, Confederate Senator from Tennes:::ee 1 was 
b11ilt was only a few feet hiz,ber than the r:i.ver.5 T.ne f:irst site for 
the fort was chosen hy Adna Anderson, a.'1 able tmd 'WideJ.vr knOl\n enei­
noer; it was selected with specific attention to hir;)1 vmter marks,6 In 
tho surveys, Anderson was assisted h'J Vl. F. Foster, later C'10neral A. P. 
Stewart's chief engineer. �hey began work on M� 101 and the s:l.te they 
selected was jast op,;,osite the moutJ'l of the Bir; Sandy Hiver. Later, 
lihen L{ajor Bushrod H. Jolmson bec&mo chief eneineor of tho Tennessee 
troops on l� 281 he shifted the location of t.he site five miles dO\m-
strea':l. Tho task of construction '!'Tat as:::;igned to Colonel A. Heiman 
arld his reclm.ont., the lOth Tcnrossee. 'l'he first (::Un waD r:1ountcd in July.7 
Because of its location on low ground, Uw fort was liable to floods 
or freshets, ciurint; wl1ich it was allilost surrounded l)y li'ater. While this 
was an acl:vantar;e ar;aJ nst land assault, it lini ted activity vii thin the 
fort and deprived it of ar:y advantage of eJflvation. In addition, Fort 
4Johnston, Life of Johnston, 400. 
-- .. 
5Horn, � 2£ Tenressee, 76. 
6nro:n.t'ield lewis llidley 1 Battles and Sketches of the �;J:' of 
Tenrsssee (Mexico; Missouri i'rinting a.nd""P,lbiishing 'UO. ;1'9 1 �. 
7Horn1 � !?£ Tenressee, 76. 
Rem"Jf was commanded b'-.t hig,h ground on the opposite side cf tbe river. 8 
While conatruction was going on at Fort lfe.nry • t.hc site for the 
fort 011 the CUmberland was more or leas neglected. It was na.;wd Fort . 1 
Donelson in honor ot Oe�al Donelson, who had selectod the eite. In 
Octol::ler1 Colonel R, W. McGavock with three 'l'ermeasec companies was 
sent to Dover. However, little was do1Je at a construeti'V\9 11.atare1 
until Johnston bec.atm eomt,£nde;r· in the "West. Real:l.�i:r.z the vulnera.bll-
i ty of that portion of 1'1le lim 1 he soueht to puah the fol"ta forward 
to completion. Lloyd !1l.ghma.n of Kent\lcq was made a Brigad;!.er Ger.lrsl 
and pl&oed in charge of botl1 torts, assumir.g conunand on llovem.bor l7/) 
In September L1eutena.nt Dixon of the Corps ot Enginest·s was i.n-
\ 
He !'eport&d that the worb at Fc:rt Hen1'7 'l'W:t'e almost completed.. Al­
though the tart wa not eituated at th$ moat fa.T<�trable spot, he &dvia$d 
that in view o£ the circurnstancea 1 t should be oorupleted, rather tt�an 
be diseontimted in favor ot the erection of worb at a more favorable 
plaOih He proposed hO'Wever that fort:.il'icat1or.s be eo:nstructed anc1 
garrisoned on the high l.and ·which eom�&d t}ae fort from tile •st bank 
of the 'tennesseE�. By th.i& time, K'en'tA.l.etq·ts mutrallty wa.s no longer a. 
problem. Meaentres were t.mn to ca:n:;r out these su�"(;!stiorlS• and a ·  
ela-ve ro:rce1 eQnt:ribiltA:td b;r p1a.nters in Tet'lmssee and Alabama, waa 
nployed in this underta.Kinc. 
In a similar ixmtstigation ot fort. Denelson Otl the Oumberl.an41 
6Jolmaton; !!!!. !!. J�to�, 409. 
'aora, !!3t !! TelU'JU_,., 76• 
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llixon aeain thought that a better position might have been selected, 
b-11t that work thero should be carried to comple tion rather than be 
moved to a more advantageous spot. He considered the water defenses 
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well located bu t  fear:ed the results of an attack .from the landward side . 
In view of this 1 he mad3 surveys for addi tiona.l outworks in the form 
of rifle pits and abatis for defense against attack .from this quarter. 
He remained to supervise the construction of these works, which was 
again done partial.ly' by slave labor • In &ddi tion, he a.dvlsed the plac­
ing of obstructions to navigation in the shoal water of the Cumberland 
below Donelson, and he also supervised this project.lO 
In September Governor Harris appointed Captain Jesse 1'a¥lor 1 a 
trained naval artillerist, to take comma.nd of the guns at Fort Hen:cy-. 
TSirlor was :Lmmediate)Jr i.rnpressed by the unfavorable position of the 
fort. He complained first to state authorities , and v,rhen, after xn.ueh 
waste of time ,  he was not heeded, he turned to General Polk at Colum-
bus who referred him to Johnston. Johnston, ever anxious aLout the 
insecure r:l.ver defenses 1 se nt his chief engineer 1 Major J.  F. Gilmer 1 
to investigate .ll 
Gilmer arrived at the forts on January 311 1862 • Speaking of 
Fort Henry in his report, he termed it a 11strong .field work of fine 
bastion front" and stated that it was in a good state of defense with 
;;eventean guns mounted on platforms 1 twelve of which could be brrugh.t 
lOpolk to Johnston, April 11 18621 quoted in Johnston1 .!!!!!. � 
Johnston, 4lo-4ll. 
llHorn, � 2£ Tennessee1 77-78 . 
to bear on the river � These included one 10-inch Colum';iad, a heavy 
cannon combini!lf:; the qu.a.li ties of the long ranr;e eun, howitzer, and 
17 
mortar, one 24-pound rif1ed gun, two 42-poundors, and ei@.t .32-pound 
caronades , medium sized artillery pieces , all arran, ed to fire between 
embrasures .formed by sandbags . He further s tated that there were ex-
tensive lines of infantry cover, constructed with a view to holding 
com,;!anding ground. He described these as "capable of offering a s trong 
resis tance to a land a.ttaek. " In addition, he considered the defenses 
opposite the fort, which had been na.med Fort Heim.an.- almost completed 
and although no guns had been received to be put in these works, the 
infantry cover there made them defendable • 12  
Concerning the defenses o n  the Cumberland, Gilmer had exa..'llined 
them in November and, although he then thought Lineport, Kentuclcy-, 
fifteen miles downstream from Dover, a better position, advised that 
under the circumstances it would be be tter to retain and strengthen 
the position, and that it was "susceptable to a good defe nse landward."  
At this time , there had been very little work done at Fort Donelson, 
and Gilmer advised the construction of defenses "as rapicl:cy" as 
poe sible . ul.) 
From the time the s ites for the two forts were first selected 
until early in January, 18621 work progressed very slowly. Attempts 
to comple te the defenses seem to have ne t  with a long string of hal.f .. 
12official P�cords , I, 7 ,  131-132 . 
13neport of Major J. 1*'. Gilmer, November ,31 18611 quoted in 
Johnston, � .2£. Johnston, 41.3. 
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hearted efforts . Moreover� there was always a shortage of troops to 
garrison the forts as well as of corn:petent artillery o.f:ricers and men 
to ma.n the trolns . Constru ction was further slowed by a. lack of labor. 
lt has alreacy been mentioned that slave labor was used in the -work on 
both forts . Althou a::h the officers in charge werE; authorized to use 
this source of labor extensively, the plan.ters and various other slave 
O'Wr'.ers in the region were quite reluctant to have their slaves used 
in this manner. There were various atte ,rpts to bring numerous slaves 
from Northern Alabama and Mississippi, but these usually resulted in 
more ,?lana a:r.rl talk than actual labor. A more adequate sup:.Jly could 
have resulted in making Fort Henr.r at least defensible snd .Fort Donel­
son poesibl�{ impregnable . Ilei ther was comJleted at the ti:ne of l ts 
respective surrender. When Maj or Gilmer agai.n inspe cted the defenses 
arot1.nd the first of l''ebrua.cy, he fotlnd them almos t completed. Although 
not as originally planned or of a permanent nature , they were co1apleted 
in the best possible �anner considering the time and res our ces at hand. 
Such thint;s as shelter for troops and supplies and adEH{11ate communica­
tions syste:a.s had not been and were never comple ted. Fort Heiman was 
never armed or fully garrisoned. It fell without a f ight, thus giving 
the Federals a position on a hei cht corruaanding Fort Henry, althou gh 
they did not find it necessary to use it . These things were contribu­
ting causes of the final surrender of the forts along vd th their 
g.u.rrisons and s tore s .  
¥11 en, abot1t the fj.rst of February, Gilmer pronounced the forts 
defensible , they were jus t that and no more . Fort Henry was an earth­
work of n.ve bastions placed in a slirrht bend of the Tennessee River 1 
19 
thus 'U:ford:Lng miles of vis:tbility downstream ard opport.tnity for direct 
stru c bed on a low :c ... se of c:cound1 whicL formed s om.ewhat of a sm:ri.-c:h·cla 
a lH:.tle Wl:\fs back i'rom the for·e.l4 'Ihese outworl;:s _,  trenches , arK!. rifle 
pits extenriad as far as tvw m.iles back on the road f:.rom l-'ort i�eru-y to 
Dover , The fort was sit;uated s o  law tbat durine high ·water ,  )'Jhich 1vas 
the case at, the tiae oi' th.e attack, a sbeet of water separated the r:rain 
fort from the outworks . At the tiH� of t.l:te atta.cl;:_, a _portion of the fort 
was under two feet of water this be irF" al:m.os t  up to ·Lte :�.m :>1atforrns .l5 , b � • 
have been a formidable obstacle to t.he li'ederal attack had they been 
completed, and [:,"Ul1S placed. thel'e • Tiley oc{..'Upied a bluff high enough 
ing courrtl7side . Built at tbe sugr..;es·tion of Dixon and with t;l1e a.pproval 
of Gilmer, these works wert: to have :mounted L'UnB lar�;;,--e cnoueh to be 
effective agains t gunboats and were to Lave "been protected by a series 
the men anl guns ...- ;.th 1\'hich to defend the position did not arrive 'before 
tlle position fell to the Federal troops . 
At first, construct.ion work at Fort Donelson was sacri.fice d in 
favor of that at l<'ort He:nry. V.hen 1'il.ghman T<�as assir.;ru:;d to com::aa.nd 
the forts a;nd arrived at Donelson in mid-December, he fou.nd six undis-
lls.Horn1 � 2£ 'I'ennessac1 81. 
l5UJ.ysses S ,.  Grant, Pers o:r.al 1femoirs , 2 vols . (New York t �iebster, 
1885-1886), I, 291. 
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ciplined companies of inf'a.ntry 1 an unorganized light battery 1 and a 
small water battery of two guns CO!llnaning the river to the north. 
20 
Places had been prepared for to:a ,32.pottnder gu.na1 but they had not been 
reoeiwd. Work on the fort bad been on:cy- partially completed, and there 
were no ou. ter defenses of anr description, From this time until tt:. 
forts wre attacked, preparations were carried on Yli th as much haste as 
potusibls.l.6 In contrast to Fort Heney, the site aelected for Fcrt 
Donelson was on high ground not liablB to !loods . '!'be main .fort occupied 
a high ridge in the rear o£ two water batteries, which when completed 
commanded the rivur. On this ridge the fort was situated ab<llt one h11l'l-o 
dred feet above the water 1 thus providing a view several miles dawn­
stream. 'l'he fort was located about one mile downstream fran the tom 
ot Dover where the Confederate commissary supplies were stored. Fort 
Donelson was an irregular bastioned earthwork, which enclosed about 
fifteen acrea .l7 It was tormd by throwing up dirt to a heiabt of abolt 
£iw or six feet and about eleven feet wide, thus leaving a sort o£ moat 
in front of the works which '01 some six feet deep and twl"Ve feet wide. 
'l.'Ma ectbwork followed the summit of the ridge or bluff' on the north 
and wet, but toward the ealtheast, it ellClosed a deep ravine and in 
this quarter was the ol'll:y entrance to the fort.l8 
.Almost at tJ:...e top of' the bluff am at an angle between the fort 
and the river, the upper water battery was located. It mounted a 32• 
l6w'.tt.ial Records .. Series I, Vol, 71 144. 
17uorn, � 2! Tennessee, 84. 
18 0.-. k,a1 At�1 I, Plate 11. 
pound rifled gun and two .32..,;pound caronades . 'i'he lm•cr battery was 
21 
about ha.l.fw:ey down the bluff and mounted one 10-inch Colum.bia.d and ei[tlt 
smooth-bore 32-poundere . '.!'he water batteries were earthworks of approx-
imate]Jr six feet in depth and twenty feet in width prote cted by em­
brasures of sandbags .19 For each of these two batteries 1 there was an 
underground powder mana.gine . 20 
When the site of the fort was fh'st selected, it was desigr.ed 
only for defense from the water side. 'l'he fort itself was built pri-
marily as field support for the Vfa.ter bat t.eries . 1'here was very little 
early thougilt given to defense from the larrlward side . l'he position 
was for the most part unapproachable by land from points on the river, 
eitl»r above or below. Hickn>.a.n Creek, after pursuing its course through 
a very marshy a.nd in times of high water impassable area, emptied into 
the Cumberland just below, or north of, the water batteries . 'l'his situ­
ation was s orrewhat duplicated just above or south of Dover where Lick 
Creek entered the riwr. Indian Creek followed its '\\"ide valley ard 
entered the river about half Wa:(f 'between Dover and the fort. At the 
time of the battle , this serv-ed to separate the Confederate left and 
right wings , virtua.l:cy- is olating the latter from the remainder of the 
garrison. 
When he made his inspection in :Jeftember, Lieutenant Dixon ad,.. 
vised too corwtruction of add�i.tional fie ld  works to protect the fort 
l9rbid. ,  r, Plate 11. 
200ne of these magazines has been restored and l71Bi'f be seen at 
t: ,e p:ceserJ.t time . The w tli::r:o o.f the ctl!er i.e dincernible . 
22 
from landward attack. He planned and supervised the constru ction of a 
line of rifle pits about two and one half miles long1 varying from one­
fourth to three-fourths of a mile in distance from the river . The 
shortage of labor and the delaq which characterized the preparations 
for defense caused the se defenses to remain incom;�lete 1 even at the 
tizn.e of the battle . These breastworks consisted of logs rolled to-
gether and placed end to end and covered with dirt. This provided some 
protection, although insufficient against field artillery and only a 
reasonable protection against infantry attack. 21 These breastworks 
l!lerc about four feet high with a two foot trench on both sides of the 
barrier 1 thus forming a protective mass approximately six feet in height. 
T.!.1ey were coru�ected and formed one long trench .from the extreme left1 
southeast of Dover and between the town and the backwaters of Lick Creek, 
to the point where the broad valley of Indian Creek interse cted the 
lines . Here 1 they were discontimed and began again where the ridge 
was resumed on the opposite side of the valley. Artillery was placed 
on these commanding points , so that the entire gap in the lire a was 
covered. The continuous rifle pit followed the forward crest of the 
ridge north of Indian Creek to a point almost directly soathwest or the 
main fort and across a smaJ.l gap in the ridge . F'rom here to t11e place 
where the ridge overlooked the na.rshy' backwaters of Hickman Creek1 the 
defenses consis ted of irregular and di s connected trenches . 'l'hese breast-
works were only partially completed at the time of the battle, and in-
21Report of Brigadier General s .  B. Buckner, february 18, 18621 
quoted in Ridley 1 Batt.les .!!!£ S._ke........,t . c._he .... s .,, 54. 
2.3 
stead of being connected as the others 1 they were separate trenches 1 
ranging from twenty-five to forty feet in length. It is interes ting to 
note that 1 while this unfinished portion of the works did not corf!.c::and 
the main approach to Dover and the fort , it did command ore approaching 
road and was t.'le wing of the defense irnrnedia.tely before ti1e water 
batteries and the �ain fort.22 
lm.'"nediatel:y in front of these rifle pits , tle ridge made a 
steep descent to a series o£ almos t contimous ravines . The slope from 
the rifle pits to the ravlnes was heavil,y wooded with oak and scrub 
growth, ar.ICi the ridge varied in height from fifty to e ighty feet aver­
aging about seventy-five feet.23 On the slope alonG the front of these 
outer defenses , the trees had been felled in order tLat their limbs 
would point ootward toward an attacker. The limbs of the trees had 
been cleared and s harpe ned, so that they presented a difficult obstacle 
to a force attacking in mass formations . Although not completed, thi$ 
abatis covered the entire front of the landward defenses.24 On the 
opposite s ide of the ravi11es before the rifle pits, rose another. almost 
parallel rldge along the crest of which ran the 'tmn's Ferry Road, which 
was of great strategical importance in the battle . Spurs and various 
other elevations along th�.s ridge later afforded cormnanding positions 
for F'edera.l artillery • 25 
222.!....!• Atlas, Plate 11. 
2)o££icial H.ecox·ds, Series I, Vol. 71 165. 
24o. R .  Atlas, Plate 11. 
25Johnston, � 2f. Johnston, 440. 
The area between the rifle pits and the main fort and Dover was 
cut by various irregular ravines which branched off from the valley o£ 
Indian Creek on its wq to the Cu.mberland trll"ough the middl.e of the 
24 
area to oo defended at I<'ort Donelson. These ravines and consequent 
ridges were also heavily wooded_. and before the Confederates fortified 
the outer line aJ.ong the ridge 1 they had been constructed into an 
abatis similar to the one described. This later served to hinder Con-
federate communications and troop movem nts between different parts o£ 
the J.ine .26 
While the Confederates were thus preparing their defenses 1 the 
Union was preparing to move against them. As early as Mey 11, 18611 
steps were taken to provide a fleet of gu.nboa'fs to operate on western 
rivers. On August 30, Captain Andrew H. Z.'oote of the United States Na.v;y 
was placed in charge of naval operations on the western waters . 1be 
boat� were constructed wide and short, so that they would draw a minimum 
of water in the shallow rivers . Some of them. mounted as ma..ny as thir-
teen heavy guns and were plated w-lth iron. These boats began cruising 
the Ohio and Mississippi by early September . By the middle of Ja.nu.ary, 
18621 tlle Federal com:n.andera had developed the plan of' movirJg against 
the Confederate defense . line by wey of tm Cumberland arrl Tennessee 
Rivers . This seelTJed to be the most logical pla.ce for such a moveroont., 
since Col:u.mbus and Bowlirtg Green on the left and right were much more 
strongly fortified. l�'rom January 23 to 24,. General c .  F. Smith with a 
force of l•'ederal troops made a re connaissance to Fort Henry. A few long-
range shots were exchanged between t he fort and the gunboats , but no 
damage was done . On ,Jcmu.ary 281  Grant and J:'oote at C<dro both tele-
25 
gr�?hed Major General H. w. Eal..leck, Federal c oramanci.er oi' the Department 
of t •. 'lle I/fissour:t with headquarters at St. Lou.is , askint; peruis:::ion to 
move a.ga:'Lnst .l.i'ort Ile:rrry.. On Februa.:r"'.f 2 Halleck t,TcJ..nted this recr.lest and 
gave full authority to Grant , 27 
Grant 's plan of at.tack c.Ulod for a s i..-wJ.ltaneous land and water 
assault on Fort Henry at 11 :00 A .  U., on Febrttar-.r 6. 'l'r...c river had been 
so low th&t. the boats CO"!lld not pass, but with the coming of rains in 
lato January, they began to rise and soon rose above the Confedt;rate ob-
structions as well as natural hazards . Grant ' s  troops -v.rere divided into 
three dlvision.s. The :First Division under Brigadier General J. A. 
McC1erna.nd was to move from its poi..11t of disembarkation on the e&t bank 
to take positions on the roads bet"Ween Forts B£nl!'y and Donelson, thus 
preYenting re�n.forcements or re·troat. The S-econd Division lYas to t:e 
landed on the ·west ba:rJt a...."1d t;::;.1::s and occupy the he::..£;hts ir:.clllding Fort 
Hei'nan, oppocite Fort Henry. 1'his division was c olJ.:::an(icd b:,· fu·icad.ier 
General c .  r. Smith . The thi.rd ciivision under Grant hirasel.f wa.::; to be 
lancled (lti the cast bank and inveot <md a.szau1t the fort from the land.-
vnard sida . 28 The not.illa. cf se-.;,"en f:..'1mboa.ts 1 fo:l!' armored and tZirec 
wooden, was to rnove on the fort at 11 ;00 A .  li�. ,  opcr.J..nc fi.ra at 1700 
27Ibid. 1 441.. 
-
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yaz'ds dis tance ane clonint; to 6oo yards �29 
The Pirst Division was ferried up the river on ?o'.Jrua..r".f 3 a.."ld 
dise;:�ba.rked accordi ng to plan at ltra LJJ1ding1 e::.ght r:J.ile s below fort 
Henry. la:nd 'l';:_ s so poor 
tlli".lt they were forced to reer11bark ::md J::l.illm a second disembar�;:ation at 
Ba:i.J.ey ts Landing, tlu--ee miles below tl'w fort. 'I'.he Second Division 
visions were pu.t in motion on the morniq:,; of the si}tth. Heav;y rain fell 
thrrughout. the night of the fifth, leaving the ground I!llldcy axu:l the 
creeks swollen and fille d wi.th backwater .. UcClernand to t his troops in 
motion IY.r 11 :00 A .  a. on the s:L"'{th. Althou.c;h onl�r t.:.lJ.ree miles from the 
fort by the r:: ver, the route ·which they were forced to ta.k�;? over back-
country road::� :nea.Jured close t.o e2.ght miles . Only I':alf o.f this :had been 
covel"t�d 1rhcm t;ho tro<Yps heard tile :s ou.nd of tho artillery cl!.te l botf:rec.n 
the fort an.c� tl:te flotilla. !lear'inc a report ·C}mt t.he Confederates were 
evacuating the fort, �!cCl(�rnaml r:w.de all pos .. ible has te ,  end his ad-
vanced. cava.J.ry cGm1e upon trw ConfcHlorato ' s  route of rc t:cc t:�.t jus t a.s 
!-,ba."1wh:Ue , tlill t.,"ltnboats unde:r Foote had attacl<ed the fort as 
duel from 12 :.30 until 1 �45 P. u. when the Confed.erate bamJer was lmvered 
in sur:render • .3l During ·this engagernent every gunboat ?las hit 1� 
29Ibid, , 123 • 
.30Ibid. ,  126-l)O. -
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times , and the Essex was com_pletely disabled when a shot hit her boiler 
and ex;1loded i t,32 
�Vl'...en the F'ederal gJ.nboats first tested the range of Fort IIenry 's 
guns on February 4, Brigadier Gernral Lloyd H .  'l'il.gh:n.an, comnander oi' 
Confederate defenses on the Cumberland and Te nnessee , was inspecting last 
minute work ol'l the fortifications at For t Donelson .  Upon he �xing heavy 
firing, he ,  along with Colonel Gil..>ll.er1 Johnston's head engineer, who was 
als o  at Domls on, "Want immediately to Fort Henry, 'n1..e remainder of that 
dq and the entire next dey" -were spent in preparing for the approaching 
attack.)) The total garrison at fort Henry on t.h.e eve of the attack is 
given as 2734 n:en by 'l'ilghman in his report.3L. 1'he inves ting force under 
Grant numbered around 171000 men.35 Tilghman realized his desperate 
position. He had only eleven guns in the fort with which to face the 
fifty-four guns of the seven gunboats . There was water two feet deep 
in the fort and surrounding it on three sides ., All avenues of escape 
were cut off' save one and it w·as threatened b'IJ the investing for ce .  
Having only a small garrison hopelessly outnumbered, he decided t o  allow 
the garrison to e scape to Fort Donelson, keeping only t he he avy artillery 
con1pany to man the guns of the fort. In this manner, he sought to cover 
tho :retreat of the main column until such a time as they should be safe-
32Grant. Mem.oirs, I1 292-29.3. " ' 
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l;r a:wiiJ3", Tilgh.man remained in the .fort serving at one of the �.u'lS to 
relieve t.he chief of th at  �)ieee " l''inalJ.y, ju.st l::.lefore two P. M. 
ha.vint only J.:·our guns remaining in action and fearful for the lives o£ 
his neroic gun crews 1 he ordered the i'l.ag lowered. 36 By this time 1 
tne ma.in column had 1n.ade good its retre at, encountering only the ad.va.nce 
t:,ruard of the .Federal J!'irst :Ui vision. 
Thus, .Fort Henry be caroo the first major step in the direction 
of the eventual defeat of the Confederacy. ':i.he fort coulci not Have 'been 
held with even a larger garrison than it had. It 111as badly outm.anned 
ar.d oatgunued. In add :cion1 ita position has come in f or very severe 
criticism. It does seem to ha.ve been badly situated for e:fiective de-
f'ense even between adversaries of more equal strength. Speaking oi' 
the surrender in his report, Lieutenant Colonel Ltl.lton A. Hc9i)TnfHs 1 Chief 
of the tennessee Corps of Volunteer .Artiller.J had. this to s a;r ;  11.t> ort 
Hailey" was of recessity conipelled to S"lli'render, if no t  to the gt.mboa:ts 1 
certainJ.y to llenaral urant • s  investing arli\V• The fault was in its loca­
tion, not its d.e.fenders .uJ7 1'ilghman, who d.istru.sted the position f1•om 
the OOg:i.nning, describes it in his report I 
The wretched military position • • • •  unfortunate location . . . . 
The entire fort together with the entrenched camp spoken of, 
is enfiladed from three or fo:1r points on the oppooi te shore 1 
while three points on the eastern bank cornpletely command them 
bot'h, all at easy cannon range . At the same time the en­
trenched camp a.rrar.ged as it was in the best posnible manrsr 
to meet the case , was two thirds of it completely under the 
control of th£."' fire of the gtmboats . The histocy of milita.t"''J 
360:f'fic:tal. Records , Series I, Vol. 7 ,  133. 
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engineer1rl[; records no parallel to this case ,. Points rd th­
in a .few miles of it, posses::.:: inG great advantages and few 
disadva:t'ltat:�s , were t.ota.J.Jy negle cted., and a location fixed 
upon vrl thou t one redeern.ing fe atare or filling one of the 
man./ requiren�nts of a s ite for a work such as J:t�ort HenT"J•.38 
lmrn.ediately following ti:�C capture of the fort, Foote sent 
Lieu tenant Comrn.ander S,. L. Phelps wi th the three wooden gu.nboate to 
ascend the Tennessee and destroy com.rm.Ulications and shi9•?inr; as far as 
Muscle Shoals at Florence , Alabama.. TLis expedition was speedily' 
carried out with the gunboats capturine two steamers and forcing the 
Confederates to burn six others ., 'b3side the half completed t,"Unboat, 
Eastport, which was found at the landing at Cerro Gordo .  In addition, 
two hundred stands of an::::s were captured, and various other military 
stores were destroyed. Also 1 the railroad bridge twent-.r miles above 
Fort Henry was se cured, and part of the track was dastroyed.39 
After the fall of F ort llcr.ry, it was evj_dent to the Confeder-
ate leaders that. a combimd land and water attack on Fort Donels on was 
im.!J.inent. The s-:.tccess of the gunboats at Fort Henry made i"ti obviou.s 
that the .Federa.J.£ would not waste time in making a sirlilar attack on 
Donelson, Late in Janum"Y, Brigadier Gor:aral. Gideon J. Pillow had 
29 
ooen placed in ch.art-e of tlre Confederate forces at Clarl:sville , between 
Donelson and Nashville . After TUchman beca"'O a prisoner at 1-�ort 
Henry, Brigadier General fushrod Johnson was made col'.lt!'..ander at Fort 
Donelson. Almost i:mnediately (the follcminc day) Pillow was ordered to 
move all his troops from Clarl::si.rille to Donels on and as � ume  co:m:mam. 
38�. , 138-139 . 
39�. , 15.3-154. 
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Troops were moved !'rom Hopkinsville to Clarksville tmd Bric;adier Geoora.l 
John B. Floyd was ordered .from his ca.·np at Russellville to Clarksville 
to assume command there in support of .Donelson. Gil:.acr, who had escaped 
from Fort Henxy just bei\}re its surrender , a.idcd in the last-minute 
preparations for tl:te defense of Donelson. Johnston also ordered Buck• 
ner with his div-ision from Bowling Green ·to Donelson. Although there 
was considerable disa.greelil0nt among the ra:nldng Confederate officers 
as to whether or not an all-out stand should be taade a.t the fort, there 
were by Ii'ebruaxy lJ about 171000 men in the garrison. Johnston's plan 
seerns to have been to make a. calculated defense of liia.'Shv:ille at 
Donelson. This idea was also held by Pillow 1 l1i th F'lO'IJd and Buclmcr 
feeling th at such a stand was not likely to accord succe s:s . &J vir·tue 
of seniority o:f rank, .Floyd became the COl:Jr;1a:rtder; Pillo11 v;as second 
in corJl.llllltld wlt.h .a,ckner in charge of tim rigpt w-.i.:ng and B. R. Jolmson 
the left.40 
.. uter his success a.t Fort Hen.ry, Grant telegraphed Halleck : 
» I  shall take and destroy F'o:rt Donelson on the 8th and. return to Fort 
Henry. •4l He was unable to .tulfill this promise probably because of tho 
bad roads , and the fact that lw ·was waiting for reenforcements . Heavy 
rain made the roads covering the eleven miles between the two forts 
virtuall;y impassable , and he wanted to allow tinte for the gunboats 
to come up in support. l'his mcessH.a.ted their going back down the 
40Johnston, Life of Johnston, 4.33-442. 
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'I'ennessee to Paducah., "UHmce U!J the Ohio to the :nouth of the Cumberland, 
and up that river to Fort .Oonclson. Grant • s :forces reconnoi tared the 
area between the two forts during the intervening time 1vith Grant him­
self riding to within a mile of the Confederate works on the day after 
the fall of F'ort Henry. 
'lbere were two very good roads be�reen the two f orts .  One _,  the 
dire ct road, connected the two forts at a distance of twelve miles .  
T'ne otJ:1er B'WUng off to the southeast for some dist<:mce soon after leav­
ing Fort IIezry and tr..en paralleled the other for abou t tvdeve miles 
terminating at the town of Dover.,42 Cons idering the a bundance of raL"l 
which had falle n on them, these roads were in good condition . The 
only portion of them which pro1.red di.fficu.lt was the first tvro miles 
back of Fort Henry, where they traversed the lowland wb ..  i.ch was flooded and 
Inarshy in some places .  J3e cause o f  this 1 the l"e derD.l e.rtillery and 
much of the infantry was moved back to the high t,Tound on F'ebru � 
eleventh. Beyond this difficult stretch, the roads passed through 
heavy tirabered_, rollin[; country which was sparsely populated. The 
roads 1rere found to be clear and unobstru.cted vthen the I•'ederal.s first 
came upon them, and their cava.l.l:w activl ty prevented ar�y subsequent 
work of obstruction by the Confederates , if any was ever attcr:lj-Jted,.LJ 
It has since been deemed by some writers unfortunate for t.he Confeder­
ates that the roads "Were not obstructed, as a delay would have caught 
the arnt•r on the march in ver<-J severo we ather .:md mi£Pt have contributed 
42arant, Me:moirs 1 I1 294-295. 
43officiaJ. Recor�, Series I, Vol. 7,  161-162 .• 
to breaking up the expedition.t4 
On Februoo.7 twelfth, Grant moved on l?'ort Donels on with about 
151000 men, His organization remained the s ame ,  with McClerna.nd, c .  F • 
Smith, and Brigadier General le"Ws WalJ.aoo as his d:�vision corJ.manclers . 
Part of Smith ' s  re giment was left as a garrison at Fo:et Henry under 
Wallace • s  com.""Jancl. The troops trure deployed in line of battle t.L.at 
sa:-ne dey 1rl.th Sr.Uth co:;;:rr;J.andir.tg tho left., �1cClernand the right. On the 
fourteenth, fJallace carae up and occupied the cc r�ter allowing r.IcClernand. 
to more fully j.nveat the Confederate loft in front of the tmm of Dover . 
Wh.en the gunboats and tra:nspar'ts arrived on the :night of the tb.irteenth, 
the 10,000 reenforcements brought with them vere assigrJed ·to this center 
ae ctar under Wallace . 
The thirteenth was spent by tl'1e Federals in drawing tte ir lines 
closer and placing thair artillery in advantageous positio:ns all along 
the line ,  iflUch difficulty was encountered in the latter ·because of the 
dense growth of' brush and trees which prevented observation for art.il-
J..e:ry fire . ArtJ..l)tHY axcha.:nges and s ld.rmishes were coiruilOn all that J.a3r. 
The l''ederal t roops had. b.:r nov,r established their line on a r idge running 
roog.hly' par.'ll.lel and ju;;:;t opposite three uncormected ridges on t•hich 
the Goni'ederate rifle pits were situated., 'll1e I"ederalz d.id not con-
struct breastworks except f ::r  co-."'er for artillery in s ome places ., The 
44Johnston, I.:i fe of Johnston_. 446. �he rr!a:i..n force of the 
l•'ederal arnw moved 1FOrii Tor� Henry on the twelfth. The temperature 
dipped a.lr.'.os t to zero the following evening, and the entire area 
underwent a eevera storm of s now, sleet, and hail. 'lhis was sorely 
felt by both an.U.es , but by this time the Federals were bivouacked in 
the woods before Fort Donelson. 
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distance between the two armies was by this t:i,cne only abo�lt .f.i.ve hun­
dred yarc.s .4.5 
The most heated action o:f that d8iY was an attack n1ade by a 
brigade of lJ:c:Clernar.d• s Division against a Confederate battery in the 
left center of their line , The bsttery which had been siving Mc:Clernand •s 
investing .forces trouble all day 1ii'a5 situated in an advantageous posi-
tion on the crest of the ridge form1ng tl'le Cor.t.fe<Wrate center, M:c:Cler-
nand, seendngly ·wi t.hout forethought or justifiable reasor.s1 ordered 
tlJfl position attacl:red. In order to attack, tho bl'igade j<ait to descend 
from the :ridg'O on whi ch they had tulren position, cross tl:le b:road ravine 1 
ar.d advru ,.oo up the side of the ridt;e on which tr.�e Confederates were 
for tl.f.iedJ t.he las t port:i.o:n o:f "this attack ·Mw over tho alJo.ost. impas-
s able abatis of .felled tiniber and brush . 'I'he ridce i'rom which they 
deaccmdeu was one hun-Jl-ed .feet hil!,h, and the pos itLn at·i:.a.c;red occupied 
an even higher point on the oppos ite ridge .  This at.tci,xpt on the Con-
federate lire s was sher.::r .folly, "hen the attackers began tbe ascent 
t.lwough the abatis , they were met wi th a 1nurderous cros sfire from 
artillery, as well as srna.ll ann.s from t�J.e rifle pits • lltho:J.gh they 
fou.gl:Jt bra.ve],y 1 they vrere beaten back a.nd .for ced to a.ba.1·1don the a.ttempt.46 
.A sirnilar at tack Ti&s 1rtade against the Cor..federate right by a por·tion af 
.Smith • s  Division tr.lth sim.ila:r result4> . Otl:.e:rwise , slr:..in'lishe s were 
fought .fail:•J.y eer..erally alol'J.g the ontire line through:.;ut the day. 
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That afternoon and nic:ht ·ta�e v:eather took a sudden turn from. the 
mild1 clear course which it had followed for several dey"s . 1� slow rain 
began to fall in the aft�rnoon, and by ni;;:;ht this had develope d into 
a heaV'J downpour . The temperature went down to ten degrees ,  and hard 
winds turre d  the rain into a blizzard of sleet and snow. Doth armies 
suffered terribly as both vrere forced to weather the s torm 1rl.thout 
shelter or adequate clothing • In addi tion1 ma.ey- of the day' s wounded_. 
who la;r in the no man 's land between the lines , too far out to be 
helped, e ndured the terrible night. Despite the miserable conditions, 
artill: ry fire was continued throughout the nir:;,ht by both sides J and 
during lulls in the storm, flames raged through the brush :maki.ne the 
night a veritable hell for the troops of both a.rmies.47 
The following morning tho entire F'ederal notilla arrived, and 
although land action was at a minimum all day1 there was far from 
peace and quiet in the fort. Foote ,. 1t'flth four ironclads and trto 
wooden gunboats , attacl<:.:ed at three o ' clock in the afternoon. As at 
Fort Henr;r, he soug,ht to steam straight up to the fort and s ilence the 
batteries a..">d then to pass above the fort and cat off 81."'fY" posc.Jible 
retreat by the Confederates • 1'.he gunboats opened fire from a distance 
of a. mile and a ha.l.f and advanced until they were within 150 yards of 
the batteries . However , the Confederate t::;tms were effectivezy manned, 
and, vthile the ten light pieces did little da."Rage to t.."IJ.e armored gun­
boats , the gum1ers poured destructive fire at them with the Columbiad 
and loni;: ran::.:ed :rifle d gun. Itr tho <md o.f an bour ru1d a ha..lf', all tl1o 
bacl: downstream. 'l'horc VJ'Cl"C fif.ty-f<YJ.r C<l.S\.H1ltics uboa:.�d tho ;_::unboak 1 
while not one :lUll ·�::as los t  in tito ConfoJ.c:rate tat i:eries .48 
'l"hat s aJ�l.O morni•lf:. I"lcr.rd called a ccr.J.ncil of trar :!.n w:: ich all the 
Confederate co:umanders agreed to evacuate the p oo:2.tion. 'Zhis dc c:�s:i.o:: 
was caused partially by ·�';'}IJ c.xa;):;eratod reports that Gr.:rr:;t was roce:!.ving 
30,000 to )01000 raen.forccrilD:n ts ru.1d partialJ�;r 
the victory of the vmter b::.tt;,:;rios :wer tLc r�;.nbow.ts , Flo;,td still 
realig.1u:tent of tb;dr trocps .49 
of tho Gon.feder;:;.to dofeDse;;:; on tho c:::treme left and cx·os;:;ccl t:.;c inter-
dire -:: tion to Clw.:dot t.e and. tl:o :nee on tc l�a.shvillo • n1o Foder:::J. li'irs t 
Division was · strooc;J¥ :posted acros:'> and alone th.is ;road. Its use ·nould 
entire road of Federal troops • 
'fh.e :plan of battle calle d  for an at,tack by Pillow ' s  left TJine. 
49Ibid. 
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Buckner wculd remove his entire force .f:rom t!!e tre:ncJ:�s on the right,. 
leaving onJ.y one regir:J.e nt of four hundred and fj.ft�r �n to defend that 
sector and form to tho rear of and in support of Pillow. Everything 
want according to sche ,;.ule , and tho attack was made at five A . M. When 
Pillow's advancing columns came upon McClerna.nd• s  line ., they found them 
in line of battle . For ttree hours the Coni'ederates were successful 
as they drove their adversaries back foot by foot. At eight A. M. 
McOlerna:nd appealed to Wallace on his left for aid. It could not be 
r:iven as Wallace ' s  hands wore tied by an order from Grant, who was in 
con.t'erence vrlth Foote abroad his gunboat several miles away • The order 
was given before Grant ' s  departure and prohibited tho br:l.ngi r:g on of a 
cene:rtU.. engagon�mt.o Continued pressure by Pillow with Buckner a.:Lding 
now on the rieht flank pushed :McC1ernar.d 1 s  nen back two miles ani 
li tera.ll;),. into Wallace 1 s line . Thus , \ihi.llace v;as broucht :Lnto the con­
flict in self-defense . �� earJ..v afternoon, t11e entire route of escape 
was cleared•-
At this point, one of the r,rea.test tactical blunciers of a war 
filled with such blunders ocC'..trred, Iiather than march the arrey- out of 
the fort in retreat and thus preserve invaluable numbers and experience 
for the Confederate cause 1 Pillow reversed t.he plan of battle and 
ordered the troops back into the fort. Buelmer questioned his author­
ity to do this , and I<'loyd1 who arrived on the scene, agreed with fuckmr. 
A short time later, after he had consulted Pillow, fi'loyd reversed his 
decision <;J.nd re ca.ll0d the troops to the fort.50 It is difficult to sq 
why this indecision was prevalent among the Confederate leaders . Con­
tributing causes might have teen ine:A.-perience1 inability to evaluate 
the situation accurately 1 and posdbly fear of failure. 
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Meanwhile, Grant, returning to his forces as fast as possible 
after learning of the Confederate attack, came upon the s cene . He had 
been four or five miles north of the lines when conferring with Foote 1 
and with the marshy roads retarding him, he was sometime getting on 
the field of action. In arriving at the point of the Confederate 
attack, he passed tl'£l left and center of his line , finding all to be 
in good order there . Sizing up the situation accurately, he guessed 
just what had happered within the Confederate lines ; the right had been 
left undermar.ned in order to 11ake the attack from the left. He immedi-
ateJ,y ordered his own left to attack the Confederate right. '!his was 
probably the first evidence of Grant 'a milita.ry genius . Ckn:eral c .  F. 
Smith ' s  Divis ion attacked vigorouslY and b,y night had taken the de­
tached and disoom:ected rifle pits on the Confederate •a extreme rig:ht 
and forced fuekner•s troops , who had returmd fran the attempted break-
tru:·ough1 to take a position on the one remaining rid{,re which separated 
the Union forces from the water batterie s .  The position defended by 
&lckner was now commanded by the elevation of his previous rifle pits 
in Federal hands.5l Consequently, the Federal troops along the entire 
line were reformed and ordered to advance 1 thus retak"'ing th.e ground 
which had been lost. 
5J.arant1 Memoirs, I1 305-3o8. 
That nig(1:i:. at Floyd ' s  headquarters in t.':�e Dover Inn, a. f :L.ial 
meet�.nc of "tlie Con.federa.to COJ:l'linanding oi'f�.cel"'S wat: he ld .  As in previous 
councils 1 dis a.gree:.:L nt wa:;; the r.Jle and not the exception. fucl:nar saw 
no alternative but surr·e:nder, and :Floyd seomed to agree with him. Pillow 
tJ1ought that the fort should be held for one or if pos$ible two 1n.ore days . 
Colonel Na.tl::an B. l'orrest, wLose cava.J..r-i had plcyed a brilliant role 
in the previous dB¥ 's action, expected only to fight the following dq. 
In lieu o:f sur1'e1lder1 he proposed that the entire garrison be m.arched 
out over the \'\Ynn 's Ferry Road1 as r£ had reports that tJ1e Federal 
troops had not re-occupied their form.er positions . He ventured to 
promise that his cavalry would protect the retreating arn:w. Finally, 
however·, t.1.e de cision was :nade to surrender the .fort. l"o:rrast aslred 
for and re ce ived pe:t"lniscion t.o ntarch his cavalry out over the river 
road1 which wac under three feet of water . Irlcryd sour;hc als o  to escape 
a..;.d. tab."e his brigade wl th him. 52 PilloT; insisted that he would person-
ally never sarrender. Buckner fina4 B{,-TeeJ. that he 1rou.ld. remain in 
the fort and s-u.rronder it .. Consequent],y 1 Floyd passed t.J.1e c or;uand to 
Pillmv, and he , in turn, passed it to Bu ckner . 'l'hus , Fort Donols on 
.52Floyd had been secretru:y of War prior to the beginning of 
hostilities . As such he was accused of dispersing Federal troops prior 
to the war in such a. manner that they v;ould be least effective against 
a. rebellion. He was also accused of moving arms and munitions from 
northern arsenals to those in the South where tl::oey could be ea.si:cy 
taken by' the Soutil should there be a rebellion. His capture probably 
would haw resulted in his 1:irial for fraud, e nibezzloroont1 and possibly 
treason. James lUliott Walmsley, "John Buchanan E'loyd1 " Diction!:Z � 
American Bio�ap, ed. by Allan Johnston and Dumas Malone , 21 vols . 
ana index (l or .. : Scribner ' a '  1928-1944) I VI, 487. 
i•'la .. rzy- of the Confederates na.nac,�d to esca.:rle from l?ort Donelson. 
Floyd left early Sundq mornina viith his b1·i�ade of Virginia troops 
aboard t.-wo boats l'l'hich arrived durLJg the night. Others, including 
Gilmer 1 were ferried across the river i'I'om whence they escaped. 
Forrest marched his entire ca.va.lry comnand out ·through the backwaters 
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carrying all th06e possible with him. Artillery troops cu. t loooe their 
horses and rode them 011t the sante wa;r. others merely set out on foot 
and in the confusion passed through the Pederal lines . Brigadier 
GeneraJ. B. n .  Johnson escaped in this r:Jannar. Accoi11)aniad by anotr£Gr 
officer 1 he simply walmd ou.t of the fort. In all, probabl;r only 
about one hal£1 or 7000 to 8000 men lTerc taken prisoner by the 
Fort Donelson was a great victor:r for the Union. lt was cele-
bra.ted as such.., and Grant and his three division corm;'l.anders were 
promoted to the rank of Maj or Ge:ooral.55 Throughout the South th.ere 
was a terri.fic feeling of depression and do:feat. The line oi' defense 
was b:·olmn, and the South la\v open to the Federal invaders . The next 
step in this invasion will be dealt with in Chapter III. 
The elevation of 1 ort llency placed it at the mercy of the 
Federal. f:."Wlboats . 'l'he high water around the fort prevented an effec• 
.$.3norn, AruJY; 2£ 'renressee, 94-96. 
Skibid. 1 96-91, These figures seem to be tt.te most accurate 
estim .. '1te a.vartable .. 
55ara.nt.�� Memoirs, I1 ,316. 
tive de£e rJSe on the landt'tard s ide .  'l'he fort fell af"OO:r:· only a ehort 
struggle ; this mi;�;ht Lav0 r;eon prolon.....-.od 1vitl:� a larger and :-:tOl"e able 
oo.fe:;,:.cl:�r:.c force . I tv inpossiblo position wac well l:nor;-n to T:Ug..'lman 
u •vell as others who col!ll:JCntad t1.pon it in the reports mentioned. 
TJ.-;.e s tiff defense which was J;J.·ter made a.t Fort Done leon whe:r·c there 
-were a few to.?or;raphicoJ. advantageo shows that tl:c selection of the 
site of Fort Henry was a grave mi;,:;talw. 
'l��e elevation of tb.a b1;1i'i' ..Uonc the river at Fort .Donelson 
vm.s used to such an advanta{:e that th.e Confederates , with abou.t the 
sa.'Ue nu.m'oor of g:ms as they had oaplo:,red at Fort Henry, Yrero .nblc to 
defeat decisively the ::; anie  fleet of g..mboats which demolished that 
fort and forced it to surrender in o�- a. short ont;a€,-eraont.. The high1 
steep ridges around F'ort Donelson and the town of Dover Wel"' tnade 
virtually impl'egnable by the c onstruction of rifle pits .along their 
surmnits and abatis to their i"..C'onts . All tl:le Federal charges ·were 
�mccessfu.lly repulsed by the Confederates in these positions wi th tba 
exce.ption of the i'inal cha.rt,re ar;a.:i.ns t cl:e incomple ted works on t.l1e 
defenders • right; tho loss of this portion of the ir  1ine was due to 
the steep ridges and :;w-shy ravines within ��Jhe Conieclera.te lines \7hieh 
prevented re-enforeetaents from arriving in time to reliovo tbe out­
r.u.rlbcred troops :L"l that sector . 
CHltPTEP. III 
THE BAT'I'L.l!: OF SHILOH 
The fall of Forts Lcnr;r and Dorelson resulted in the loss of the 
entire line of defense for the Co1'.federates . l'fi tt the Cl.l:raberlMd and 
Ter:mssee Rivers c ontrolled b;r the F'ederal f�.lnboatc � tLo Confeclera.te 
positions at Columbus and Bowlin.[; Green were o:.Ltf1s.nlrod. Rea.liz.ing 
the seriottsness of his situation, Jol'.:nston had ordered BO'IvliP_.e Green 
evacuated even befoi-e Donelson fell. The a:r:cy there retreated to 
Nashvi.lle to await the out.come of the s tr,tCD:1e for possession of the 
Cumberland . Wit.h the Federal victory at D0nelson, Nashville t:ecrune 
untenable . It see:ms that Jo:b.nston •s 001'.' plan was to concentrate all 
.his forcez nouth of the Te r:m ssee Hiver and there dispute the Federal 
1 ad:va..11ce .  
:Ja'1:t of the Con.federo.to stares at Nashville rrere cva.cua;tcd, 
b'..:tt the at"Cer confu:..ilon and chaos in the cit;;,r \Yhich re:.rn.ltcd fr om the 
approach of the Federals ca:v.ned much to be lc ft or ;Jlundored b:r the 
populace . A lack of tran.o;:)ortation .fucl.li tie s caused much to r.Je 
abandoned. i'irs·t ilo;y·d1 after his o.rr-lval from DoP..elz on, and then 
F'or:t'€H:Jt, was in charge of eva.cuatin;; the s tores and maintail1iP.g order.2 
Under the cirC'-L.T.s'tances� the se men did an admirable job. .Floyd•s 
work in this capacity was hif;,hly praised by Hasil w. Du:ks_, biographer 
lrforn, � 2£ frennessee 1 99-107 • 
2Johnston1 � .2f Johr.ston, t:.9B. 
of Colonel John n. rJorgan.J 
After the loss o:f Nashville and the control of the 'l'enressae and 
Cu.m.berland. Rivers ,  the most irrrporta11t strategic position in the wer;t 
was the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. This road connected the 
Mississippi River 1.vith tle Atlantic Coast at Charleston. It swung 
southe ast from lVlem.phis throagh northern Mississippi and across northern 
Alabama a.long the southern bank of tba Tennessee H.iver. Connections 
could be made from its main tracks to Chattanooga and the railroad 
route northward throagh Knoxville to Virginia. The Memphis and Charles­
ton met the ·rennessee River from the west at Sheffield, Ala.bama1 near 
the Mus cle Shoals . lhis was the extent of low-water navigation on the 
Tennessee and, thu s ,  the exte:nt of the con'b:'ol of tl1e Federal gun-
boats over tl·�e river. Johnston, realizing that Grant would seek to 
eut the railroad at the earliest posc:ible tiJlJe , s our;ht to concentrate 
every available man in an effort to stem the tide of the Federal. 
advance • '£he best place for this concentration was at Corinth, Mis­
sissippi, where the .Memphis and Charleston Cl"ossed the Mobile and 
<hio Railroad. Corinth was situated only about twenty-two miles !rom 
the 'l'enreasee ftiver and offered an excellent po;::dtion from which to 
observe the �'ederal movements on the river .  Here , the Confederates 
accunn.1lated large s tores o£ supplies even before the arrival of the 
various portions of t.� a.rnw .4 
3&sil w. Dtdre ,  Histo:z of MoHan's Cav� ( Cincinnati : Miami 
Printine and Publishing t!o . ,  187)1), 7-518. 
4uorn, Arr][ � 'renrJ.:�ssec, 107-108. 
Uajor Ge neral P, G,. T. &auregard., 'Who assul1l9d corm:l13.nd in the 
Columbus sector on E'ebruary 15, e le cted to evacuate that fortress :ln 
order to shorten the Confederate lines of communication. 'l'he fact 
that it was v:i.rtuully cr..ttflanked by the Federals on the Tennessee 
Riwr further i:nfluenced this decision. Thic withdrawal left Isla.i:d 
Nu.miber Ten and New L'ladrid, :'.1is::;ouri 1 as the ;:1os t advanced Confederate 
defense line which ran from these points southeast across Tern�szee 
to its e ru.; tern terminus at Corinth. Mlile this line was long., it ad-
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mitted easy concentration at any one point bocauae of the proximity o£ 
the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. He lo ft abo:.J.t 7000 mn at Island Nw:lber 
Ten and New 1l�id and 9laced the remainder of the Columbus earrison, 
l<¥X'O ron, at Humboldt, 'l'enmssee , close to the center of this line . 5 
1le&1Whil.e , the ll'ederal.s began a moverrent up the Tenrassee . 'lhe 
ultinw:te obje ctive was to sever Confederate communications at such 
places as Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt; the immediate objective was 
to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Cree k  ne ar  Eastport, 1/dssis-
sippi, on the Memphis and Charleston line. In preparation fen:' this 
General. c .  :F. Smith oocan the expedition on March tenth.. On t.'lw 
thirteenth he landed his four divls ions at Savannah , Tennessee , a town 
on the east banlc in Hardin County. hi:JOd:LateJ.y Smith sent Major General 
William T. Sherman with his division in nineteen steamboats escorted 
by the gunboat, !ller1 to dastrat.r the bridt,re .  
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This atwm:'t resulted in utter failure .. No sooner had the :F'ederal 
troops leJ.1d.ed tLan a. violent s tor.:n began, and tJJ.�:� water rose in the 
stroa:15 a:t tl .e rate of six incLos per 1vJt:tr. 'l'he divi:.;ion was forced 
to retire to j.ts ·t.ra!1Si)Ol�ts and fall back dmvnstream, V,j th the river 
so h�.el11 th.e boats could fin:d no suitable �"lace to la:nd until they 
roacl1ed Pittsburc Le.nc;.inc, where high blnffs rise on th.e vrost bank and 
pr·ovide dr,:;r gro;md sui table for enc.:uitiliJl(mt. 1'hc lnndine:; is about s:ix 
miJes upstream from Sava.rmah and almos t. twenty-two miles from ·t11e 
Confederate s t.ronghold at Corintht In ea.rl:L::;r and more peaceful tiJaes_, 
it served as the river J.At"1dine; for Corinth and was connected with that 
place b.;.r two r;:ood roads • 6 
Gra.ut had been in the bad graces of Halleck and1 consequent:cy-, 
was t..e:ii:_.iorari�· removed from command on March sixth. On the thir­
teenth he was restored to command a.nd moved prOitr.Ptzy to SavaDr�ah <M.�.ere 
arrived at Sava"lnah , he found a.bcru.t half tho ru·n�r e nea';'lpod there on 
t!1e ee.st bank,. one division und.er Ger.eral UYW Wr�:tlace at Cn11:1p ts Landing 
at Pittsburg LandL1g , where he had retired after the failure of his 
raid on tb:e :.rcmphis and Charleston Hailroa.d. Grt.mt prepared to march 
against Cor'int..l-t,. as soon as he could be re-e:nforood b;7 ;,rajor Genera.J. 
Don Carlos Buell's Army of tbe Ohio1 VJhich was marching ov�'Jrland from 
Nashville , In pre:;aration for this advance , Grant ordered the d ivisions 
6orf'icial H.ecor�, Series I_, Vol, 101 22-23.  
ot: BrigadJ.or General w. .!I. L. Wallace a.nd i'i:ajor General Stepl::on A,. 
tslrlbu.t to move from Savanr1ah t-:> .Fitwh�.1rg Landing and there oncc:mp. 
General 1!cCle:rnand1 s  ilivinion was sm:t directzy thoro w:·,en it came up 
tLe river . T'nus 1 Grant :nad four divisions in the a..� a arcr..md fiVes-
iug daily 1 they were orgw.lzed into bricades and later into wl1at boca.� 
the Sixt • lt Division com,;aanded b�.r l�:i:ajor Gomral B. M, Prentiss . 7 
When the fall of Fort Done ls on and the advance of EUell1s a.rli\Y 
I'Emiiered l�ashviJ.le indefensible, Jolmston fell ba.c�� on 1ill..trfreesboro. 
In order ·to i'orra a junction with Beauret;ard at CorilJ.th1 he evacuated 
disci:t;lincd and fresh nwn to uove from Pellsacola, Florida, to j oin 
Johnston and Beauregard at Col"inth.9 Thus , with appro::d.mately 40,000 
rnen concentrated at Corint.'-1 the Confederates 1 .r:or tJile first t:�r.:e in 
the west, ryound themselves vti th an arnw lru:ge enough to do battle 1vi th 
the Federals . It was Johnston ' s  plan to do this 1 bei'ore £hell cou.ld 
7orant, M�::aoirs, I., 324-3.)3. 
8 Johnston, � 2£. Johnston, 505. 
9lbid. , 513 . 
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Hardin Cou.nty 1 l'cr..nessec 1 in which the later battle of Shiloh 
occurred, c ontains ;)a:r·t.s of two of tl..e ph;,vsiographic regions oi' th.e 
state . In t.b.e eastern se ction of the county is tl::e sou.i;bern part of 
tl:.e Highland Rim, with its rugg;ed terrain of rocks wad swii't-i'lowing 
streams . In the west is the soutb.ea.st col'l'lel:' of the Slope of ·�Jest 
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county anC:. followi.ng a two hundr·ed and f::.f·tzy- to three hun.dl•ed foot deep 
The flood ,plain of th.e r::i..ver vades from one to four miles in widtllt 
In places along the outside of t.h.e s tream curve s ,  bottoms are cntirel3' 
absent. Buth Savarmab . .:md. Pittsburg Lal1dinE are located in such posi-
tiona, the fol'iacr on the cast bal."'Jc and the lat"wr on t.i:..at o:f tl1k! west. 
'l'lrils 1 :.,ot.1. places appear as bluJ.'f:; rising directJ.3.� :i.'rom the l'iver and 
lta.ve no i£1l..ladiate hitm-water pl·obloms . The streams flowing int ..o the 
Tenr..essee from tl:Je v�est are slug, ish and t,"Emerall;v have con.s icierable 
bo/17..toill61 llhlch are ,1sually dawp and sogCf and s�.xaet:W.;.es r,l&'sl"l;}'"•lO Be-
fore <:.he Temlessee Valley �httbori"o/ harnessed the r iver for flood con-
u�ol me&1Ul'eS , these streams were subject to O"ver.flaws caused by high 
water in the 'i'enoossee .. 'l'hia was tbe case in the earl,y sp1•ing or 
1862.11 The topography on the wes tern s :lde  of the river i5 vm:ied1 
much oi' it being of' a rolling nature . !!�&IV kinds of timber abound 1n 
l<ltt. B. Jewell, "Geology and Mineral Resources of Hardin 
Coun't\V1 Tem� ssee ," in Tennessee Geological Survez lblletin, No. 37 
(Na.shvillo : Ambrose, l?jl), 12-14. 
llibid.. ' 102 .. -
thick groves ar..d s crub form. The only town in the county of a.n;;r size 
at the time in question was Savannah, which became first Smith ' s  and 
later Gra.nt •s headquarters . Its population in 1870 was around five 
hundred.l2 
Remnants of plateaus are evident in the wes tern part o£ the 
county. Usually erosion h.as been rapid on the plateau s lopes because 
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of the soft na t'1.1re of the rocks . Of'tentinies ,  tl.wse remnants are wholl;r 
or pa.rtiaJ.J,y dis se cted and cut a:t�ey by streama .l3 Tb.e battlefield of 
Shiloh was one of the be't.ter preserved of these plateau remnants . 
At Pittsburg Land:Lng, where Grant ' s army was e ncamped, a steep 
bluff rises from the river to a. height of about a hundr d feet. 'l'hus 1 
with a good road to the foot of' the bluff 1 an excellent s teamboat 
la.:nding was provided, as the channe l of the r-l ver ran close to the 
bluf£1 that being the outside of the s tream curve . Here , a mere ham-
let of three or four log cabins and a post office were situated. 
P'rom tt1e landing the land stretched back for five miles in a s ort of 
wrinkled plateau, described by Buell in hie report as an nundulating 
table-land. •l4 Its level was from eighty to one hundred feet above 
the level oi' the river and toward the east was creased and cut by cktep 
ravines , wh:lch opened into the river . �llile it was cut with 
ra:vines a:n.d fa.ir:cy- heavily wooded, there was ample open ground for the 
l2J. B. Killebrew, Introduction to the Resources o:f Teru:essee 
(l�ash".tille : Tavel, Eastman, ana f:t6we!l;-lti'14) I !M&:!o�i3. 
l)Jewell1 loc .  cit. , 15-16. - -
14o£ficial 1�cords 1 Series 11 Vol. 101 293 . 
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camps and drill of an arnzy- of a hundred thousand men,. l5 
In addition, the area was flanh."'d by strea.nw both to the north 
and s outh. ln the .forroor direction, Owl Creels: rises about four miles 
west of the r iver and flows northeast, until it J'.l'Jeeta Snake Creek 
flowing east to the TenTJessee , where it :finds its mouth about a mile 
belm1 t.he landing, On the s outh, Lick Creek r:i..s�;s re ar  the sou.rce 
of Owl Creek but flows generally eastward to its mouth two miles above 
the landing . Ravines ,  cut by eros::'Lon, oven into these various creeks 
.from the sides of tho plateau .  This is especially true on the north 
along Owl Creek, Generally, the area was a. forest, but occas iona.lly 
there was a small farm of twenty to eight acres , l6 
There were two good roads from the landing to Corinth. One of 
these followed a. more or less direct route by way of Monterey, thirteen 
miles from. Pittsburg and ten miles from Corinth , The other, known as 
the ltidge fi.oad or the Bark Eoa.d1 follo"''�ed a. course more to the north 
and joined the :no.re d::.rect or .Monterey Road s oL'le five miles out 
from the landing . In ad.di tion to these, there were two roads .from 
Pittsbu:q; Landing to Crump 's Landing, one of v.i.lich followed close to 
the river. This road continued southward beyond Pittsburg to Harriburg1 
a landinc four or five miles apstre a.m. :G'ranching off from the Crump 's 
Lar.ding road was a road to Purdy 1 county seat of McNairy Cou...."l.ty 1 six-
teen miles to the northwest of Pittsburg . ·rhere were two roads which 
l5rbid. , 21 . 
16roid. , 293. -
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ran northward from Honterey to P...trcy and S av<J.nn.s.h ,  both oi vrhich crossed 
the Ridge Itoa.d. At one of these cros::roo.d.s lived a fatili}y na.':led Miclmy. 
This became an it:lpori.aJ:J:. landmurk i.'or t.he C<m;;:'ederatc troops . Somo five 
r:dJ.e s  out. from Pittsburg Landing tbe var·ious roads rJZ·anched out in a 
·p 0,,:, , 17 ""'"' � ·  
.f.:oix.t ·t,.:.s ?m:·cy Road cr-:>sse d Cor L: t.h �-..oad a.r,i,d. followe d a ho�vily' 
unC.e:c Colonel Jo1'll  A .  
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the Hamb.trg Road. In front of these posi tiona 1 the ridge fell awq to 
a series of deep ravines .. These ravines were thickly set vii th trees 
and undergrowth and 11ere flooded or boggy along most of the line .l8 
To Sherman' s  left, with a considerable interval between and 
fill:i.ng the gap !»tween Sherman 1 s  First1 Third1 and Fourth Brigades on 
the Corinth and Purey Roads and his Se cond Brigade on the Hamburg Road1 
was Prentiss r Sixth Division, with uneven rolling ground to its front. 
SherrJlan • s and Prentiss ' Divisions were tl:e outposts for the Federal 
camps . They occupied the space between Owl and Lick Creeks a.t a point 
near their source , where they were less than three miles apart.l9 
To the rear of Sherman and Prentiss and covering the interval 
between them, 11ere the camps of McClernand's First Division. � two 
miles to the rear of the advanced divisions were Hurlbut ' s  Fourth and 
Smith 's, later w. H. L. Wa.lla.ce 's ,20 Second Divisions on the left and 
right respectively. lew llfallace ' s Third Division remaioo d encamped at 
Crump ' s  Landing guarding the storage point far the Federal supplies , 2l 
Although the Federal a:r:rrv <.lid not intrench or otherwise constl"''lct 
defensive positiona 1 the area. itself provided good ground for defense . 
l8ll1lliam T. Sherman� ?.femoirs of General William T .  She, 
2 vola. (New York# AppletonJ 1B7S}, I; �!o. &rea:I'ter atea as �mo:Lrs .  
l9lbid. -
20Pr1or to and during the battle General c .  F. Smith was in­
ca.paci tated by an accidental 1e g injury. He remained in the Cherry 
Mansion, Grant's headquarters at Savannah , where he died from infec­
tion not long after the battle . Brigadier General w. H. L. Walla.ce 
comrnanded in his absenee • 
2lsherm.an1 Memoirs 1 I, 236. 
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The Federal leaders were later severely criticized for this neglect, but 
they considered themselves employed in 8.."1 offensive cam))aign and l::�&"dl,y 
expected the Confederates to leave well-built defenses at Corinth and 
attack them in their camps . 22 Speaking of the F'ederal position in a 
report on March 17, Sherman had this to ea;r : 11 I am strongly impressed 
with the importance of the position, both for its land advantages and 
its strategic position., The ground itself admits of easy defense by a 
small comrnand and yet affords admirable camping gro ... md. tt2.3 'l'he selection 
of' the area around Pittsburg Landing far the Federal ca.rr\P is genera.J.:cy­
attributed to Smith, vtho ordered the flrst men there • Of the area 
Johnston s&¥s : 
It .was, in fQ.Ct, a formidable natural £ortification. With 
few and difficult approaches , g..tarded on e ither flank 1:w im­
passable streams and morasses 1 protected lJ1J a succession of 
ravines a.rd acclivities , each com.'JJll.nded by eminences to the 
rear, this quadrilateral seemed a sa.fe fastness against attack­
hard to a.ssail1 easy to defend. Its selection Wf!S the dying 
gift of the soldierly c .  F. Smith to his eause .24 
During tl:Je latter part of March, the Confederates kept a strong 
detachment a.t Bethel Spri.11gs on t.he Mobile and Ohio Railroad and at 
Purdy 1 four miles east. From this posi tion, they watched the :f'ederals 
at Crump 1s and Pittsburg. \\hen it became evident that I:hell 'W&S near­
ing Savannah vrl th his a.:riey" 1 Johnston elected t o  follow his previous plan 
and attack Grant before the tr:o a.nnies could be joined. Thus, on April 
22Grant, :Vemoirs, I, 3.33. 
2.3official F..ecords 1 Series I, Vol. 10_. 27. 
24Johnston, � .2£ Johnston, 5.31. 
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3 he issued orders to that effect. The overall plan of battle was to 
malr..e ever-rJ effort to turn the F'ederal 's left fiank, thus c-J.tting off 
their lire of retreat to the Tennessee River and driv!.ng t!:em back on 
OWl Cree k where they would be forced to surrender.25 
The Confederate forces 1 knmm as tl:Je A:rr:q of lliseissippi, was 
organized into four corps . Tho Firs t Corps was cotn.;landed by Hajor 
General Bragr;, the Second b;;r Major rxe:ooral Polk, the Third by Major 
General Hardee , and the Reserve by Brigadier General Irecld:nridge . 
The Third Corps was to move that same dSJT .t April third, on tlw 
Ridge Road to the Bark Road. If posc_ible , it was to bivouac that 
nif";ht a.t Mic�y 'e at the intersection of the road from Monterey to 
; 
Savannah a."'.d Purcy. At 3 :00 A .  �1. on the fourth, it was to l'llO"JO forward 
by the Bark Road until within sieht of the Federal outposts and there 
be deployed in lire of battle acroe s the entire front extending from 
Lick Creek to Owl Creek. 
The Second Corps was to assemble on Monterey and move there at 
once . They 1rere th.en to move by the Sava..'ll'lah Road to �lickay * s 1  the 
head of the column reaching tl�r-:: before night. On the following 
morning, they were to advance by the Bark Road as s oon as the rear of 
the '!bird Corps should pasc: a."ld ibm in line of battle about 1000 
yards to the rear of that Corps . 
The First Corps, from which the detachments at Bethel and Purctf 
had been ta.ken1 was to follow the line of :11al'ch of the Third Corps a. 
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half hcr.1r to the rear a.nd bivouac tb.t.t ni;·jlt in t.hnt position at the 
sar::Je interval. The following dD\7, it was to cont:i.nu.e on the Bark Road and 
form a tli ird lL"};) with a s imilar interval. 'rhe ?Ort.ior:. of tl .at cmnnand 
at Bethel a.."1d Purdy was to assenble and .'·J.arch to join the rest of' �"le 
Corps at the junction of tbe Purcy Head -rr:i. th the Bark Road. 
The reserve was to assemble at rt::ontere;{ by the shortest and 
best routes and, thus forra to r:1arch toward tr.e front b.Y e ither the 
dire ct road or the TUdge Road to P.lttsbu.rg,. Cavalry was to oo throm 
out in all directions btJ the various commanders , so that the intention 
of the Con.f'edarates could be disguised as well as possible . 26 
It is of particular interest to notice that contrary to the usual 
method of attack, whereby detachments are arransted in colUl'llllS perpendic­
ular to tr.e line of defense 1 the Arr:rsr of t.he Mississippi was arra;red 
in three parallel lines Yli th its reserve to too rear ..  This alignment 
caused considerable con:f'usion during the battle , &B detacruoonts from 
the lines to the :rear were t.'t."''wn forward into vro"iou.s :Jlaces in the 
attack line ,  thus ca.usir.c a definite lack of coherence in carrying out 
co-:nm.ands . The reason for such a."1 ali(J'n;nont v1as probably the fact that 
the leaders thcr.J&ht these raw, ine::r:perienood troops would .f'ieht better 
in :ra-ni liar u.ni ts .  
The plan was to attack -tbe Federals ea:rly in the morning of 
Aprll 5. This was not to be1 however, as the elements which had pla\}l'ed 
havoc v.dth the war in the west again assumed a prominent role . Showers 
fell all day Thursdl\v 1 the fourth, makin;::; movement alone the dirt roads 
di..fficult for artillery and wagons . 'I'hon, after midnight, a. spring 
storm brolre , making the night miserable for the Confedor.:!.te troopa 1 'Who 
-wrere lT'.arching without tents. Th.e night was pitch....a.ark and mere gullies 
and ravi:res be cam impa.aoa.ble torrents . However, at 3 :00 A. M. on the 
its artillery and wagons 1uere s tuck in the mud. In addition, parts o£ 
other colu.mns -were deJ.a¥'ed in arriving at their aJ)pointed positions . 
Bragg ' s  Corps had found the roads so bad that it was several hours be· 
hind schedule , and because o:f this daley- Polk's column had been held 
up. Bra.gg 1 s  entire com,;J.and 11as not i:n position until 4:00 :P. 11. on the 
fiith. Thus , it '\'las t. oo la'OO to attack that &Jv.27 
About that same time, the now famous " council o:f war" was held 
near a crossroads to the rea:r:· of the Confederate lines of battle. The 
and Gilmer from Hardee • s  command. I:n addition, there were several 
staf'i' officers and other officers present. 28 
Be cause macy of the troops had used up their rations, and much 
noise had been made on tlle m.arch, Beaure gard thought they no longer 
held t..�e advantage of surprise . He recommended th at  the 3...."'4V be wi thdra1m 
to Corinth,. After listeninr, to the views of the various ofiicers 1 
Johnston announced his decision to attack at da._yliE;ht t..'h.c following 
:a:t;a:;, he remarked to a staff of.ricer, " 1  woulC: fi[:l1t tl:e:m. if they were 
a million. They can present no gz'Co.t-er front between these t-#o creel\8 
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tr: a.n. we can ; and t!1e more n-en they crowd in there 1 ·::.he 1•0rso -we can 
tllilm it for tl"Jem. n29 Th.u.a 1 t.:te stage was set .rar tLe Bat·;:.lo of Shiloh . 
Vihen ·t.he Confederates a:tta.cbed t.he i'ollov1ing morning, "Lbcy did 
r.ct know t.hc exact location of the Fo(l.era.l lims . The f:irst clash 
vras betlroen :aa.rooe 1 s  advancing line anc: an early raornine reconn=li s sance 
party sent out by one of Prentiss 1 bric;ade c on':::1ander� .  l�f'tar a brief 
skirmish 1 the Federals retired., and U•e Confederate line STie:;;t into 
·the ca;'nps of P.rentiss • Sixth Division. By 8 :00 A. ;,,r.. , they l'lere in 
possession of the out.ire camp .30 
3/iuch has been wri t·i.;en and said about tho extent to whic..'"l the 
i''ecicrals were surprised in that ;;:·irst or...slaught .. Various COi.L:anders 
gvidences of surprise were quite eviG.e:nt. in the corr.,.,J. t� on in v:ilich tlJe 
att.ac�::ers fou11d the cam�;s and in t;:1e ;,ta:.'1Ill3r in \Wdch. the attacl�: was 
root.  From all the se  it nus·i;, rJO assu.rned that tbe Federals ·were not 
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ex_r.>ecting an attack of a t;eneral r...aturo • .3l 
F.J.sawhere ; the :F'edcral.s put up a l':!Ore determined res.�.stance . 
a di:f'.':.'ic-J:lt ravim vd.t1-.:. his headquarters at Shilo1: Cl1.urch. IiBarinc the 
first noise of battle , this divisior.. was pos ted a.long this ridge in 
position to have a [:;ood line of fire at the Ccmfcderates as t;.�ey crossed 
the ravine , althou.gil tlJO thickets there afforded the Coni'ederate s so;�:.e 
prote ction.. 111e .first assau.lt against this position wa:;; repulsed_, but 
Prentiss 1 re't:.J."<.;;ut left Sh.erman1s left, flank unprote ct�d, and he was 
forced to fall back • .32 Beauregard m.acl.e Shiloh Cr.�Urch his headquarters 
.following tlJe Confederate occu : ation of Sh.errna.n • s  camps , ace:., thus1 the 
small. log structure served t-r:o opposi.ng a.r·::des as l1ead.qu.a:t· eo:ts on ·the 
points at the s ame  tir:e .3.3 lhis was a. tactic born of :cc esGity as tile 
31Th.is is one of' the great c ontrov-ers ial is�; ,les of the battle. 
However 1 half eaten braaktasts were found in Prentiss 1 camps , half 
--�· 
d:ressed prisoners 1rrere -t:.a.!.ren1 and tr1e Federals organized no effe ctive line 
in the vicinity of these camps . Johnston, Mf!. ,2! Johnston, 574-591 • 
.32Sherman, il.lfemoirs, I, 236. 
33ara.nt, Memoirs , I, .365. 
broken and wooded character of UlC field1 interspersed with a .few 
clea.ring;s and C'tll ti vated plots 1 resi sted the formation of a:rr:r stable 
Federal defense line • Thus 1 t!e Confederates were seldom able to 
bring pressure upon the entire line at once 1 as while part of the 
Federal line was stable 1 it mi;;;:ht be fluctuating in another sector. 
Although the Confederate attacks had a demoralizing effect on the 
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soldiers in line 1 t'bey did not have the effect on the entire ariJ\Y' which 
a. more concerted and &reneral attack might have had. 
Soon after the apening of the battle 1 most of the Federal troops 
in the field were e ngaged,.. McClerna.nd. re-en:forced Sherman's left, 
w. H. L. Wa.llaee moved into the center in support of Prentiss , and 
Hurlbut 's division formed on Prentiss '  left. Grant wa.s eating break-
fast at his headquarters in Savannah when he heard the first roar o£ 
cannons announcing the opening of the battle . He immediately boarded 
a dispatch boat and set off upstream, stopping at Crump ' s  only long 
enough to order I4w Ytallaoe to hold his troops in readiness .  Soon 
after &"'''iving on the field1 Grant sent orders to Wallace to mow at 
once to join the r'ederal right.34 l'flzy- th.is movement was delayed will 
be discussed mo:t-e fulJy in con<·1ection with other re-enforcements . ·  
Between lO cOO A. M. and noon, th.e Confederate advance received 
its first serious check. Heretofore , the � had mowd forward 
ma.in:cy" much as the result of the local charges, but the Federal lett 
and ce nter were finally able to effect a uniform lim. Wallace 1s and 
34uorn1 � .2£ Tenmssee, 131. 
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Hurlbut •s  divisions 1 alone with the remnants of Prentis s ' shattered 
for ce ,  had found a natural lire on which ·t.o ralJ.y. 
Along the crest of a ridge there was an old1 abandoned road 
which, as is comrJ.on with dirt roads , had been worn and washed ot1t until 
it formed a natural rifle p1t.3.5 In following the ridge, it ran cGnvex 
to the attacld.ng Confederates , therefore, m.alcint;; it diL icult to out­
flank. The road 114Ui lone s .Lnce been abandoned, and underbursh had 
covered its sides , providing even mo:t-e pro te ction for the defenders .36 
This position was located about t."Jree-fottrths of a mile to the rear of 
Prentiss ' ea.w.ps in the center and left of the e ntire l"ederal lire and 
jus t  east of the junction of the Hamburg and Savannah and Hamburg and 
FUrey Roads . In front of the old road, ran a picket fence which pro­
vided additior.al infant:cy' cover. Horeover , there were logs and other 
defc.mses has tily prepared by the l''ederal.s . l"rom the depression of this 
road the i'ederal infantry could pour a devastating fire upon an at·tacker 
wi th  very little da.nt.-er of exposing themselves . In addition, all the 
available artillery was posted irmnediately behind the road in order to 
add to this weltering f:l.re . It was "shorter, stronger., compacter, and 
more continuous" tJ:1an the first Federal line • .37 
Contributing to the strength of this position, tJ1e ground in 
.front, over which the Confederates had to a'ttacl::, was ideal. for defense . 
36nukD, History_£,£ Morca.n.•s Ca.v�, 147 . 
37 Johnston, Y£.2. !?£. Johnston, 600-6o6. 
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Along the right front, a large open plot k:novm as Duncan Field sloped 
awa:r from the line. In the center was a se ction of' vvood.ed undergrowth 
which helped prevent organized, massed attack. Qn the left front was 
anotb.er field of' c onsiderable size slopinf; flJli<Irl in a. s imil..:.'.r mar:u:er 
to D-tncan Ficld)8 In part of this field il:>taediatel;r before tl1e 
Federal left was a smi?J.l peach orci�ard and h:!hind this a t..1rlcket of 
black-jack trees, in which there was a small pond. Here tvro batteries 
of Federal artillery wro pla.cod, one in the peach orchard and w..e in 
the thickat.39 In the de.ferse alonG t.lJ.is line , 1'� . H .  L. litallace com-
manded the right, .furlbut the left, and n.�entiss the cerJ:.cr. 
;\!1en the Confederates first came on this position, tl�y attempted 
to tal:B it in the same lTh'lil.rJI:Ier in which they had force d  all the previous 
Federal positions, by localized attack. At first, a. brigade charged 
t..'w position without success and. with dreadful casualties . 1'hen1 as 
the a.dva."'l:Cine Confederates came upon the position in greater rumbers, 
larger detachments were hurled across the fields and thicl<et. Charge 
after d1arge was made ,  s ane  of thorn reaching the natural rifle pit which 
he.s come to be calle d tiw '*Old Sunken Road," hut the results were the 
s a.::-.s 1 a.11d tbe Confederates suffered terrible losses . 'I'he bullets were 
flying so thick that the Ccm!ederatos ga;ve the area tbe l:'lame "Hornet •s 
38Descriptive information gathered from the restored area of 
Shiloh National Military Park by field trip1 Harch1 1953 • 
.39John Allan Wyeth1 Life of General 1-Iatha.n Bedford Forrest 
(New York: Harpe r, 1899 ) 1 rr;:- Th'iS pond.' \Vas ca!le<i "Bloocyo Poiiin 
because it ia said that the wounded o.f both armies drank there until 
their blood tttrned its color red. 
Action continued in this sector for l'llOl"El than four hours , and the 
Confederates di d  not truce the position until they had turood both the 
l7ederaJ. right a.l'ld J.B£t .flanks • Sherman Tvas slmvJ..y forced back on the 
Federal right until the Confederates were virtualzy in the rear of the 
11Hormt • s  Nest. " S:imilarly1 the F'eder;:J,. left woo turmd by repeated 
assaults in that secto:r. 
After personal.l;r leading a successful charge a.ga:i.:rJD t the Federal 
ri�Jlt1 Johnston was struck by a chance shot and died from loss of blood 
a few moments later . Undoubtedly, he embodied tba spirit of: the Con­
federate attack, and his loss was sorely felt. As second in command1 
Beauregard a66Ul'I!Gd- the direction of t.i:-.18 a.:rnw.4l 
Meanwhile.; Brigadier Gemral Daniel Rugr;les, commanding Bragg ts 
F'irst Divls ion1 had gathered all the available artillery and placed it 
opposite the E'ederal position on the "Old Sunken Road. " ln all, twelve 
batteries were formed in a single line from wilich they poured a devastat­
ing fire into the l"edera.J.s .42 By four or fiw o ' clock, the Federals had 
been fia.nJged to such an extent that they ware virtually surrounded am 
.fighting back to back. Realizing the dangEtr of capture , w .. n. L. 
Wallace s ought to ret:l:re his forces tartard the landing. In retreating 
down a shallow ravine 1 t.hey were caught in a murderous cross-fi:re in 
40Johnston, � 2£. Johnston, 60,3-606. 
4libid. , 61)-616. -
42o.t£1cial Records, Series I, Vol. 10, 472. 
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which Wallace was mortally' wounded. Ho·wever � much of the remnants o£ 
his divis ion escaped ca.ptnre .h.3 Hurlout also ret:tred on the Federal. 
left, as he wa.s continuall,y ol.:ttflanlrod.L4 Prent::.Ss in the center was 
i.l:L>Jlinent., he ordered the troops to cut their w<r.r cru t.  This was not 
its complete destruction, he sur endered v;ith 2200 men, th.e re;::tail.'loor 
of I:is d:i.vision . This was abo<.t t 5 ;JO P .  M., 45 
The !!'ederal line along the abandoned road held from 10 :00 A -.  !J. 
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until almost 6.aOO P. 1-A:. 1heae eight hou:ns completeJ.¥" thwarted the Can-
fedel"ate att..enrpts to turn the Federal left. Had this position boen 
carried three hours earlier 1 the Confede1•ates probably v1ould have won 
the entire field and ei·tber killed or captured Oil"et'y ul&'l in the Federal 
il:r::ey of the 'l'ennessee . TJa.erc can bo litU.e doubt bat th.is one vre.:�thered 
road1 follov.-lng the lew ridge 1 provided tho Federals with their raost 
successful position in the battle . It Via.s tb.::: lrey to tho cc,:n.flict.. The 
fact that it .beld ou·t s o  lone gave k:em time to arrar;ge a.nothc.::r lire .  
'l'his tJ1e-,r did., and from behind i t  they waited for :.nieht to a.rrh"e and 
with it th� re-erlforce::n.ents which turned the tide of battle tho follow-
ing datr· 
Late in the afternoon of the sixth., Colonel J. D,. Webster of 
43Ibid.,' 149 
44ro::td. , 203-2o4. 
4511 • . 279 �· .I • 
Grant 's staff arranged S l">lre  twenty-odd pieces of artillery facing south 
or up the river . This was the lim on \'.1lich the Federal forces ra�lied 
for their last stand. It was on the crest of a bluff which overlooked 
a long and deep ravi110 knol'm as Dill Branch, which opered into t.b.e river. 
Vii th the Tenmssee at a high stage, there was water to a cor...sidera.ble 
depth in the ra.vine ,.46 The line follawed �t.he Pittsburg and Corinth 
road almost due west. from the river, until it intersected the River Road 
to CI"Ul:<1p •s I..aJ.:.dir.g. 'l'here the line turr:ed north along the latter road 
and stretche d to i:J1e brid£:,'6 over Snake Creek.47 Along this JJ...ne, the 
J .. rrcy of the Teru"Wssee prepared to meet the dey's final attack. 
Tli.at this a.tt,ack was x.evcr ::lade in force is a matter of history. 
l?eauregard1 realizir.g that his a.rmy was o.xha.ustod1 chose to stop the 
fight. 1�he tl-.!el" or not a final surge rrould. have brought corrple te victory 
to the Confederates is a q-.1est.ion which probably Tdll ne\;·er be iJJ1S'W'ered. 
The only attem,pt at attack on this . lir.e was nrade by the b1·igades of 
�iga.dier Generals Chalmers and Jackson of Braa:; 1 s  c orps .  'l'hese bri-
gades on tbe extreme Con.fedel·ate right attempted to charge this line., 
1-'ind:ing the fi.re from the art:i.llery very intense and being unable to 
advance across the 1va.ters a..'U up the steep banks of' Dill Branch� they 
.fell back and received £rom Beaaregcu•d the c:rder to retire • �.tis ended 
tJ:te battle on S\llldatr .1�8 
46ora.nt., Memoirs, I1 .34.5. 
47o. R. At��  I, Plate l2. 
48ofi'icial Records, Series I, Vol. 10, 547-556. 
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As alrea.d¥ mentioned, Grant sent orders on Sund� morning for lew 
lJ1allace to move his divis ion on the field .from Crump •s Le.ndi ng as fast 
as possible . This order rea.cood him at ll a.)O A .  M. O.f the two roads to 
the area of the battle 1 he selected the westernmost, which woold bring 
him on tl-e field on the right of 6'herman 1 s  camps at a distance of s ix  
miles .  As he neared Sn&lre Creek, he learned the Federals had been 
beaten back and his present coarse would bring him up in the re ar  o:£ 
the Confederates , thu.s cu·tting him off from the rest of tm �. He 
immediately countermarched almost tc his original point of departu.re , 
turned back on t.he more easterly River Road which followed a more wind­
ing route , and crossed Snalm Creek by a. good bridge near Pittsburg 
Landing. The distance to be covered, much of it marshy from. the high 
waters, "fr8.S aboat the s ame .  By the time he could bring his division on 
the field, it wae atter nightfall. 49 The dela;r may be attributed en­
tirely to the topography", the lack of more definite orders 1 ani the 
condition of the roads , and not to Wallace •s negligence as was charged 
Buell •s ll.rr!q of the Cllio also .figured prominently in the battle .  
He ,  personally 1 had left Colnmbia., Tennessee 1 on April 3 w:L th the rear 
division on his march from Nashville to join Qrant at Pittsburg Landing. 
He arrived in Sava.•ma.h on the fifth, the same dq on which his advanced 
division arrived. The other five divisions were marching at six-mile 
intervals . Hearing the s ounds of battle on the morning of ths sixth, 
he ordered all his divisions to leave their baggage and push forward as 
.fast as possible . He tLe n set out with his one divis ion from Savannah 
upstream to Pittsburg r�a.ndinc: follov.'ing the east bank of the stream. 
Finding tho r oads impracticable for artiller-.r, he ordered the guns left 
behind to be forwarded to the battlefield by stean�r. The one division 
Ylas ferried across the river just at nig7l.tfal.l, part of them arriving 
in time for the repulse of the previously rJantioned last assault. By 
the follawine morning, four of his s ix  divisions had been placed in 
position on the field.50 
Dtlrin£j the nid;l t the ttvo Feder.:ll gunboats 1 the Tyler and the 
�xii?ffitop, fired shells at regular interva.ls into the area where the 
Confederates were bivouacked.5l Also, about midnic;ht a drenching rain 
began to fall. Partially be cause of the shells from the b"il.nboata and 
partially in order to find shelter from th.e rain_. the Confederates 
retired to the tents of the abandoned .Federal ca.'nps during the ni@1t 
and, thus allowed the F'ederals to re-occupy cor:nanding posi tio:rus so 
dearly "WOn in tJ1e da\v''s battle.52 
Wa.l.lace brought from .f'lve to eight thousand JJ)9n on the field tr1at 
nicht1 and Buell ' s  four divisions &'llounted to more than 201000 men. By 
morning the l�'edera.ls had almost 301000 fresh troops with ·which to a.ssttn¥:l 
50lbid. , 291-292 . 
5lnonald Davidson, The Tenoos see, � New  River, Civil !"!:: !2, 
TVA (Rivers o£ America SerieS� ed. by R'ervey Men and Car! r!armer 1 l1ei York: Rrnehari, !9IiS), Y .  
52John6ton1 !!!:£! .2f. Johnston, 639...642. 
offe n.s�lve operations , exclusive of those involved in tho first da.Y'e 
,('.; ..... t J. ..L..t,f"" • To oppose these 1 the Confederates CO".lld wster a scant 201000_, 
if that mruw.5.3 T'nis comparti..son of forces is tho l:.ey to the battle on 
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the second da\r. There was :really never a contest, although the Con£ed ... 
orates put up a. very stiff fight. They vrera steadi.l,y pushed back, until 
they left, the field in an orderly· retroat in mid-a.fter:r.oon. The J!'ederals 
rn.ade no attempt to !ollaw1 althouGh Breckinridge was left with his 
conxna.nd to act as a rear gua.rd.54 
Both sides claimed victory at Shiloh. Certainly it was one ot 
tl:e hardest fought a:nd bloodiest battles of all time . 0£ 401.335 men 
who went into battle the total casualties for tr�e Confederates in kUled1 
wounded, and miss ing wore reported by· Beauregard as 101694 • .55 Sirflila:r 
casualties of' the Federals were listed as 13,047. 'l"heir forces had num­
bered approximately 6o.,OOO including the A:rrr.r:t of the Ohio ax1d tlJ:) 
division at Crw:1p • s  Lar.td:Lng. Tlw 11'od.eral forces e nc:;u:Ipcd on the field 
on the morr..int; of the first da:y numbered 371.331.56 Although nei tJ1)r 
a.t"'l'rtf would adm::i.t defeat, it Vliil!l now evident, if it had not been before, 
that it v.rould talre more than Soutr..crn fire and patriotism to defeat th� 
Union jug£,rerneut. In addition# the :Federals found. their e r:emies to be 
possest:>-ed of the qualities which predicted a. lor...g and blooey war. 
53Ibid. , 637-642. 
-
54otficial Records, series I, Vol. 10, 388. 
55Ibid. , 395-396. 
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Irl 1:1arzy- re.spects ti ·:e Battle of Shiloh was poorly planned and more 
poorly exe cuted.. The Confederates arrived on the fie ld a dey later than 
they pla.nred. 'l'his p1·oved to be a costly error as they l'IDJ:'e unable to de­
cisively de:f'eat the .F'ederals before they were re-enforced.. Contributing 
to this late arrival was the terrible condition of the r oads  leading 
acros ��' the ridt:,-es and throa.gh the swamps and marshes between Corinth and 
Shiloh. Y:hen they did arrive the Federals were surprised although 
tbey had evex-y opportunity to discover the Confederates as t:hey advanced. 
'l'he mam:Jer in which tba Confederates were organized and ·t.he inter­
spaced fields and thiclrets of the r.:tgs,ed terrain of the battlefield pre­
vented their attackinG in concerted waves .  'Ihus the battle 'I'EtS a series 
of sepm·ate a-ctions alone a s ingle line • 'Ihe ttQJ.J Sunken Road, " located 
as it was on a low ridge fa.cii:tG ini:erspa.ced open field� a..nd oonse 
thickets, provided the l:'ederals Yd.th tho :r:e cess ary advantacc ·t'ith which 
to check the Confedera:te advance lox1g enough to prove nt the�n from. fol­
lo\·:ing th.eir plans to turn th3 i''ederal fJ.ank., Dill Branch, with its 
steep banks filled wi th  backwater from tho river , provided an :i:Jl'Ipassabla 
bar-.rior behind which too li'edera.ls formed the ir last lire on April 6 .  
!'his lilJ;:; kept the Confederates from. taking Pittsburg Lancli l1[; J  hence 1he 
Federals -oore ablo to land re-en.forcer:rents '\\<'hich gave tbem tl::e victory 
the following dq. 
CHAPTER IV 
Trm EVACUA1'ION 01" COEHl'l"fl 
Villen the Confederates retre ated. from the field at Shiloh, they 
were a tired and spent a.rn:zy-. Sinlilarly, tile .Federals did not i�a.ve 
the strength to pursue their advantage . The casualties of April 6 al'ld 
7 had lef't both the Confederate Arley of 1\f.ississip1)i a.nd the federal 
.A.rnzy- of t.he Tennessee unable to contitlUe any sort of a. campaign. This 
was not true of t.he recently arrived Ar1rzy- of the Ohio under tl1ell. Only 
a. part of the latter reached the scene of action in time for the fighting 
on Aprl.l 7.  'Ihis entire arnzy� was soon bro-.1ght up ; it w as  a vigorous 1 
victorious force , ea�::er to do battle with the crippled Confederates . If 
the :iPederals could ! Ha·ve follo-11red tL.em to Corinth and maneuvered them 
into a. battle tl�.ere it'lln.ediately after Shiloh, it is poss ible t11at the 
Confedera:te cause :Ln the west would have been lost. This would have 
released men to tbe eas tern theater , result,ing in conditi ons sir.1ilar 
to those surroundin;; the capitulation of the Confederacy following tl1e 
loss of the west in 1864. Ho1vever, the Federals vrere unable to strike 
this blow ::,ecause of a series of occurrences . 
In order to :reacl1 Pittsburg Landing in time to save the Arrfr:l 
of the 'l'ennassee 1 !bell 's men had made forced rna.rches .  'l'he ru.g: >ed 
terrain and poor roads east of the TenMssee ld.ver had caused them 
to leave their supp� trains and artille ry behind. 1'hu.s on the night 
of April 71 with the Confederates retreating toward the comparative 
safety of Corinth, t.he ArllU of tl.Je Ohio found itself without rations 
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a:nd low on a.ramuni tion; they were unable to pursue • hence , the Confed­
erates were able to retire with much of their sup;Jlies.l 
111e heavy seasonal r ai ns  made roads impassable and l'va.sbe d away-
bridees . It was several d<.WS before pa:rt of the sup:;).;}- trains could 
be brousht UlJ and ferried a.crcsa the river and even weeks be.fore tl1ey 
all ar ived. .By t:·.:is tiDle , it wa::; too late for aJ·x;rthinc other· ii'lan a 
cautious sier;c oi Corinth. : !ad the:r boen able to brine up the ::l.l" supplies 
they still could not have m.a.rctad in::-:ediately. ln orc:Cr to have advar.oed 
on Corinth at once tbey t�ould :1ave Lecn forced to ccnstruct britiges 
er.tea.mped on -t.he high croun6 of tl1e rc ce::1t battle-fi(lld.. l'inoJ.ly on 
llilif 2, the river ooe;m1 to re cede .  2 
lioanwhile , Halleck .ru:·:ri vc d  at ?.i ttsbux·g Lar"Jing on .1\pril ll 
ar..d as::>l!�ncd active cor::.;.::.and in tb.e :field.,J h.e...er.forceuents t:u·z ·ived 
from variol.l.S quax·ters to bolster the F'aderal m·rrzy-. Tl:e �!oni'ederates 
had evacuated New :O.:adr:Lct, 
13_, re:tir ir�; to Island Hwil.bor Ten and the 'fEl ri.essce side of tl:e river. 
so ttat. l::e e ncircled the Confedera:tes tterc , and a siege redtlcod the 
lotficia.l Records, Series I, Vol. 10, 672 • 
.3Grant, Memoirs 1 I, .371. 
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isla11d to shambles . On April 71  tl:.e second ruw of the Battle of Shiloh, 
the island waa surrendered alone; with s ome 7000 :nen . n1e Federals 
there were then free to re-enforce their comrades at Pittsburg La.r1ding.4 
This they did, arri vinr, on April 21. By the first of ; :rey, the Federals 
had 120,000 me n  assembled in the vicinity of Pittsburg La.r:.ding.5 
To oppose tl1is force 1 !Jea.uregard had ro"t.lghly 50,000 troops . 
Those were the veterans of Shiloh , some Mississi;)})i and Alaba.:':'la regi-
ments which had been reerui ted, and an arnzy' from Arkansas 1 veterans of 
the Ba.tt.le of Pea Ridge 1 under General Sterline Price and General Earl 
Van Dorn. �'fith these troops , Corinth vras placed in a .fair state of 
da.fense . A new line was laid out about three miles to the northeast, 
in front of the town. In general., it followed a low ridge to the rear 
of a wooded marsh from the Mobile and Ohio Railroad on the left to 
the Memphis and Charleston Ha.ilroad on the right.6 Two creeks ,  which 
ran through low and heavily wooded bottoms 1 paralleled tl:.te front o£ 
the Confederate lines . In order to assail the lines 1 these difficult 
bottoms wcr..1ld have to be crossed. The lines themselves were mere 
ri.fle pits along the crest of the r idge with batteries of artillery 
posted in protected places to eonrna.nd the roads from tho front. 7 
I•'rom the position of the Federal center -r1here they encamped near 
UHorn, � !?£ 'lfmne����, :1.44-:145. 
5arant1 Memoirs, I1 371-376. 
6x1orn1 � !?£ Tennessee, 145. 
7Q£ficial Records, Series I, Vol.  10, 775. 
Pitts'rurg r.anding, two roads led towards Corinth1 approaci1int; from the 
nortl1-east, '111-esa liere tho Iiidge Road and tl1e dire ct road over which 
the Con.f"ederates had mcved to the Battle of Shiloh, 8 CJthor roads 
leavinc Honterey passed into tr.e Purcy and Corinth road to t.'ie '\'est 
andJ thus , approached Corinth .from the north ,  Two roads connected 
Corinth with Hamburg, where Pope t s  .a.:rnzy- was e ncamped, The roads were 
all narrow, unim;proved dirt roads . The direct road .from Pittsburg 
Landing was crossed by several small stre&'1S, The largest of these 
were Chamoora Creek and Seven tile creek, The former was six miles 
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!rom the Confederate worlcs , and the latter was only three , 'l'hese creeks 
could not be crossed wj.thout bridges , which had to be co1wtructed as the 
a:rmy advanced. 9 
The land between Pi ttsburg Landine and Corinth is rolling, with 
high hills occurrine s ometi 1es alone the larger s treams , The greater 
pa:rt of this area. was covered v.1.th forests , w ith intervening clearings 
around houses and settlements • Scrub growth was very thick and virtuall.y 
impassable in the lOW O'OUOO Cut thinned IY.l t considerably along tJ.te 
ridges .10 HaJ.J.eck mentions several times in his reports the fact that 
the CO'J.ntry was thiclcy wooded and marshy .n 
After the retreat from the field at Shiloh• tm Confederates 
8Chapter III, page 48. 
90£ficial. Records, Series I, Vol. 101 673 . 
lOora.nt, Memoirs , I, .37.3. 
' 
l.lotficial Records, Series I, Vol . 10., 666. 
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took position on Pea Hidge near Monterey 1 hall'way between the landing 
and Corinth . This ridge was long, although not hiGh1 and comrnanded ttJS 
approaches across Lick Creek.l2 F'rom here , brisk recon.r:taissa.nces were 
mlil.da 1  until the li;ederals ooga.n their a.dvance toward Corinth . At this 
time 1 the Confederates 'began retiring, as they ware forced slowly back 
toward their works at Corinth . 
V'�be n Halleck took co.rr nand at Pittsburg Lm1ding, he vlrtual:cy' 
incapacitated Grant by removir..g him from colm:iand of the Arnv of the 
':l.'e r.JEssec and makine him second in command with nothing to do . .Halleck, 
along with many others , was not at all pleased with Grant ' s  actions 
before and during the Battle of Shiloh . There was the s:.1spicion that 
Gra.'"lt had not tal'.en proper precautionary measures agains t a surprise 
attack. 'l'here was also a feeling of prof!�ssions.l jealousy between the 
two generaJ..s .l3 The Ii'ederal. farces were organized into three armies 
for the march on Corinth. Buell ' s  Army of tl:e <hio formed tr.e center 
o:t the adva.noe . The nawly arrived force under Pope was nar�ed the Arnzy-
of the Mississippi and placed on tl1.e left. M.ajor Gereral. George H. 
Thomas was taken from Buell ' s  co:-runand and placed in ch:nr�e oi' the Army 
of' the Tennessee on the ri {#lt.l4 The main elements of tile Federal 
force began th:eir advance on M.ay 4.15 They did not COlll[:>le tely invest 
l2Ibid. , 153. 
-
l3Grant1 �<femoirs, I, 370. 
l4ot:ticial Records , Series I, Vol. 10, 672. 
15Ibid., 665. -
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the Confederate works until Mey- 28 �16 T�Jus, twenty-four day-s were talcen 
to march the a..""1P.y over a distance of less than nineteen .m::.l.es . 
This is expla:l.ned by the cautious a.pl'roach used by Ealleck. In 
tl:te advance the Federals used all the procfllltions of s ic�-e v;arfare . In 
add.i.tion to the difficulty of travel over the irrcr;ular terrc�in .:iJ.nd 
poor roads , the Fecbrals v1ere ordered to entr€mch each position as they 
advanced., 1'his �:nade the move1oo nt extremely slow. 17 Shc:rma.:tl•s division 
on ·the extreroo right constructed sevon distinct entrencbrJd ca.»tps 1xlt\1een 
Shiloh and Corinth• He seems to think tJ1at this was valuable training 
for his inexperienced troops.J.B Finally, on U.a:g- 29, the cn·tire redera.l 
a:rrrry YiaB before Corinth end in close contact with the Confederate lines .19 
Uea.nwhile 1 v:i thin the Confederate lines all was not well. They 
had evacuated almost all their wounded from Shiloh, and the small town 
of Corinth wae unable to successfully house and treat them. An urgent 
call was made for doctors from the surrounding area. 1.\'a.ny Confederate 
women left their homes to eon:e to Corinth a.nd care for the wounded. 
'l'he town, situated on low ground, did not have an adequate water supply. 
Soon tl:;e welle beca:.w contaminated, restL, ti.ng in an epidemic of' typhoid 
fever. Ill ad',Lition1 there w:.l.V a.11 epidemic of measles, and trouble with 
SU.Pi1lios brought on malmtr1.tion and hu:r..ger. Soon t:be aili:U."; troops1 
l6cr ant 1 Ile moirs, I1 379. r ' 
l7o. n. {�.tlaa, r, Plate 13. 
18off"lcial Itecords1 Scr�.es I, Vol . 1017�. 
19 . ., ...!- H .; ..,.  I ..,79 UJ:•a.��" 1 .. :;eme ..... s, , :> • 
7:3 
o:f 1rhich aho'.1.t $000 had been wounded at Shiloh, nttmoo:t-ecl around 181000, 
Corinth becm."'le ono large hos:;1i tal ··;n�.rd. �'very available 1:.uilcling was 
used to hcr<.1se the se raen., <?..nd these \\"Bre <>ften inadeouate , 20 As a re .. . . 
sult of these eondi tiona ru1d the vas tl.y superior :;,;'ederal force approach-
ill.g his .f'ront1 Beauregard begm1 to evacuate Corinth on J\!�r 26, The 
movement was completed on Yo.[)(! 291 the cley oofore the Federals entered 
the works , The Confederates wor<� able to remove almost all their men 
and supplies southward alone the 1Eobile and Ohio Railroad,2l 
Thus thero was no decisive e nc;agement at Corinth. 'l'he �attle 
which m.i::.;ht have ended the war in the west and great:cy haste:red the 
defeat of the Confederacy was not fought. Poor roads 1 excessive rai.l'W, 
difficult terrain, and poor leadership combi:ned with a laclc of knowledge 
of the 'l'ihoreabouts of the Confederate troops corrtribu ted to the slowr.ess 
of 'the T"ederals in following their advantagG gained at Shiloh. On the 
ot.he r hand1 ·Lhe location of Corinth, the poor water sup.:;ly1 a.."'ld the 
;;eneraJ. lt:rt..�eaJ.thfulnoas of . tb.e Cor.J.'edera.te a.rm;r Ca!.lSCd it to 1Tl thd.rm'l 
rather than r:uakt� a stand. 
'!'he lor.:s of Corintl1 forced the Confederates back on a lim a.croos 
central Missies:i.ppi. Vich:abur:.:; became the most important Co:nf'odera.te 
to tl:e l''edera.ls • 'lbey now controlled. all o.f Ylest Tennessee and the 
rivers adjacent to it. 'I'hey als o dominated the li.emphis and Charleston 
20Horn1 k� 2£ T�rl!YiH'H:Jee, 148-1.49. 
2lofficial. Hecords .. Series I, Vol. 10, 762-764. 
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Railroad, the most v-ltal conl.'nunications artery in the Confederate west. 
This provided the Federals with bases from which to invade Mississippi 
and Alabama. The Confederates were never able to drive the Federals 
from West Tennessee and again occupy that region. From here the s cene 
shifted to Middle Tennessee and Co.nfederate ef'f<r ts to :retake their 
lost territor:r there. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIOO 
'l'hroughout the c:ccrnpaigns in Vtest TenrJessee , the conditions of 
the topography played a very promir.t:mt role . The Civil ffar was a con­
flict in \vhich com..'nunications were extremely poor in tel"'r!!S of present­
d.q warfare . In the beginning, the Confederates were unable to occupy 
tf.te bunks of t . .  he Ohio River as a natural line along Ythich to form. 
their de.f'er...se . Inabill ty to occupy tt.J.s line also cost them control 
of the Cumberland and Tennesc>Ge Hivers at their mouths on the Chio. 
These riwrs forl:!l3d the fatal pa.tlnv� used bvJ the :fl"ederals to invade 
the heart of Tennessee . 
In providing a defense against thl;l Federal invasions along these 
water co-11rses 1 very poor judgment was used in the sele etior£ of the site 
of Fort Henry. Its location subjected it to effective attack .from both 
land troops and g11nboa:ts . The high water, which almos t surrounded the 
fort a.t the time of ·the attack, made communication slot.' and the entire 
position difficult to defe rrl. l1'ort Donelson, situated in a mch more 
a.dvantage<rlls locality, was neverthe less handicapped by topography which 
denied the u se of any avenue o:f escape . This resulted in the loss of 
valuable manpower to tl:e Confederacy. The fort and its outworks were 
strong for a defensive posi tion1 .for the rid[.res provided its garrison 
Tlth a.n excellent line of fire on a.n a.ttacldng foe . It is significant 
that, unlike Fort Henry, the elevated river defenses on the bluff a.t 
Donelson euccess.t'ully repulsed the Federal gunboats . !.fore over 1 the only 
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part of the outer works 'Mlich were taken by direct assault ware tl'e in­
completed a."ld underraanned rine pits on the eJ>rtreme right . This, however, 
led to th.e surrender of the fort.  It may be assumed that with be tter 
pla."1l'led and more complete construction, Fort Donelson might have pre ... 
sented a. more serious obstacle to the :Federal advance . 
Ar;ain1 topography was a prominent factor in the late arrival of 
the Confederates in line of battle at Shiloh. Poor roads and marshy' 
ravlne bottoms caused the arnzy- to delay its attack a whole da;y, when time 
v.·as most precious . The rains of the season turned the soft clay soU 
of the rolling hills into a quagmire and prevented the various detach­
ments from follavdng the ir  s chedule . ..tUso, the z;olateau remnant 'Which 
formd the battlefield at Shiloh provided tbe Federal. army wit.� a strong 
natural position. The interspaced woods and fields 1 cut by ravires 
filled with undergrowth, gave the Federals points on which to ral.ly; 
this same irregularity of terrain prevented the Confederates from 
attack:i.ng in concerted s tref'.gth. The slightly elevated pos ition of the 
"Old Sunken Roacl11 and th.e dii'.f.ieult,r of assault from its front provided 
the Federals riith e. natu.ra.l i'artification v.1:11ch actually saved the dzW 
for them. 
'1.'he rugeed terrain east of the Te nnessee River in Hardin County 
caused the A:rrrq of the Ohio to leave its supplies and artillery behind 
in order to �t to too field at Shiloh. In turn, this prevented 
&.ellis f:resh troops f:rom malting w"l effective pursuit of the Confederates , 
as they retreated toward Corinth. Slowness in bringing up the supply 
trains, coupled with the di!ficultv of the roads through the marshy 
bottoms between Pittsburg Landing and Corinth" and the timidness wi tll 
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which the l"ederals advanced, c�used the delq which a.lloved the Confed­
erates to s-uccessfully evacuate Corinth. finally 1 the actual location 
of Corinth itself on low grotmd sur: ounded by marshes and creeks con­
trj.buted to the health protlems of the Confederate ari!I'J to such an 
extent that it was forced to malre t11at evacuation. As a result the 
Federals were able to occupy all of west Tennessee � exercise control 
of much of the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers , occupy and hold fue 
Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and launch the offensive vmich 
eventually split the South with the capture of New Orleans by Federal 
forces . 
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